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CBF   Cerebral blood flow 
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LUHA   Low unusual, high appropriate 
LULA   Low unusual, low appropriate 
LPC   Late positive component 
MFG   Middle frontal gyrus 
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Creativity is a complex construct involving several different mental operations. 
Neurophysiological studies on creativity have seldom fully considered this fact 
and have instead approached creativity as a single entity. Furthermore, most 
neurophysiological studies of creativity face methodological problems. The 
present studies follow a novel approach to investigate the neural underpinnings 
of creativity by focusing on one creative mental operation, namely conceptual 
expansion which refers to the ability to widen the conceptual structures of 
acquired concepts, a vital process in the formation of new ideas. Avoiding 
drawbacks from previous neurophysiological studies, the new approach 
introduced in the present work borrows from psycholinguistic research on novel 
metaphor processing to generate a passive conceptual expansion task. Two 
studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event related 
potentials (ERP) were carried out, assessing participants’ brain activity while they 
read novel metaphoric, senseless and literal sentences. Participants’ responses 
regarding the unusualness and appropriateness of the sentences served to 
categorize each trial into three subject-determined conditions: creative (high 
unusual and high appropriate), nonsensical (high unusual and low appropriate), 
and literal (low usual and low appropriate). Sentences regarded as “creative” 
were of special interest because they are thought to induce conceptual 
expansion passively in participants.  
The results of the fMRI study pointed to the involvement of a fronto-temporal 
network in the processing of conceptual expansion. Activations in the anterior 
inferior frontal gyrus and the frontopolar regions in the processing of both novel 
and appropriate stimuli reflect an increased effort to retrieve semantic information 
and greater semantic selection and integration demands from temporal lobe 
areas where semantic information is stored. The findings of the ERP study 
revealed an N400 modulation with regard to the unusual and appropriate 
(creative) as well as the unusual and inappropriate stimuli (senseless), again 
reflecting greater effort for semantic retrieval and integration.  
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1  Introduction 
 
One of the most fascinating human abilities is certainly the ability to be creative. 
From stunning masterpieces of art and extraordinary pieces of literature or music 
to the development of new products for daily use – every one of these 
innovations requires the ability to create something new. The ability to generate 
novelty allowed the human race to evolve into the highly developed beings that 
we are today. Creativity, in interplay with other important tools of evolution like 
increasing brain size and development of speech, helped humans to adapt to 
their changing surroundings and gave human beings an advantage in survival 
(Gabora & Kaufman, 2010). 
The investigation of creativity has had a long tradition. Whereas earlier 
experimental attempts were limited to behavioral assessments of creativity, the 
rise and technological advancement of neurophysiological techniques opened up 
a whole new world of possibilities for researchers. Among it was the possibility to 
investigate creativity at its origin: the brain. However, due to problems associated 
with the neurophysiological assessment and the general conception of creativity, 
research in this area has not advanced far. 
The present work is primarily focused on uncovering the neural correlates of 
creativity using a novel approach that renders it possible to overcome some of 
the pitfalls of most neurophysiological studies on the subject. It is aimed at taking 
a closer look at the cognitive processes underlying creative thinking using 
neurophysiological methods, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and event-related potentials (ERP) in electroencephalograms (EEG). 
The following chapters will give a brief overview of the definition of 
creativity and the prominent theories concerning this cognitive construct. 
Neurocognitive and neurophysiological research on creativity will be reviewed in 
detail, prior to the introduction of the new experimental paradigm that was 
employed in the current studies. The findings of the empirical studies will be 
critically discussed in terms of their limitations and implications for future 
creativity research and assessment.  
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2 Creativity as a cognitive construct 
 
As with many other constructs of higher-order cognition, the study of creativity 
can be approached in terms of different frameworks and scientific backgrounds 
which in turn influence theories and definitions of creativity in general. Depending 
on the theory in question, different aspects of creativity are of special interest. 
While, for instance, developmental theories will primarily focus on the 
development of and influencing factors on creativity, economic theories will adopt 
a more product-oriented perspective that takes market-specific characteristics 
into account (for an overview, see Kozbelt, Beghetto, & Runco, 2011). Despite 
differing emphases, most theories and approaches to creativity discuss the role 
of cognitive processes to some extent.  
The following section focuses on the definition of creativity and introduces 
cognitive theories concerned with creative thought as they build the framework 
for the present work.  
 
 
2.1 Definition of creativity 
 
Creativity is a multifaceted and complex construct which makes it challenging to 
reach a consensus regarding its definition. Creativity can be defined at various 
levels. 
For instance, the focus on what is being judged as creative can vary, and with it 
vary the different approaches to the investigation of creativity. The most common 
subject of creative evaluation is the product. Other possible foci on what can be 
judged as creative and be centered upon are processes or persons (Amabile, 
1996). A creative process is one that produces a creative outcome, whereas a 
definition of creativity in terms of a person centers on personality traits 
associated with an enhanced ability to create (e.g., Boden, 2003).  
Further, in order to properly define creativity and what it entails, a 
distinction has to be made with respect to its magnitude (Kozbelt et al., 2011). 
 10 
The magnitude of creativity refers to the subjective (private) or objective (public) 
impact that a creative outcome has. Creative magnitude covers a wide range of 
creative experiences, all of which need to be taken into account to arrive at a 
sensible definition. Whereas most laypersons undoubtedly agree on the creativity 
of an artist’s work, smaller everyday experiences of creative outcomes are often 
disregarded. The small subjective creative achievements as, for instance, the 
novel culinary creation made by an amateur cook, might not have an objective 
public impact but nevertheless need to be considered when defining creativity as 
it has a subjective impact. This distinction between magnitudes of creative 
outcomes is also imminent in Boden’s differentiation between H-creativity and P–
creativity concerning two senses in which’s light creativity can be seen (Boden, 
2003). H–creativity refers to creativity in a historical sense as, for instance, in 
situations involving important inventions or scientific discoveries which would be 
considered to be globally novel. P–creativity, on the other hand, refers to ideas or 
achievements that are novel to the individual person.  
The necessity to come to a consensual and operational definition of 
creativity that nevertheless can be generalized across the different investigative 
approaches has been a critically discussed issue since the beginning of creativity 
research (Runco & Jaeger, 2012). This eventually lead to a relatively stable and 
agreed upon definition of what creativity entails among researchers. According to 
this definition, creativity entails two fundamental features: novelty and 
appropriateness (e.g., Stein, 1953; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999; Runco & Jaeger, 
2012; Ward, 2007). For an idea or product to be creative, it must be unusual or 
novel in its occurrence and at the same time be relevant or appropriate to the 
task or problem at hand. This operational definition of creativity can be suitably 
applied to both objective (public) and subjective (private) creative achievements. 
However, this consensual definition is limited to the product level as it only refers 
to a creative outcome. The mental operations that lead to these novel and 
appropriate, and thus creative, outcomes are assessed through the cognitive 
approach in the investigation of creativity. 
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2.2 Cognitive theories of creativity 
2.2.1 Early theories 
 
This section will highlight the theories that focus on the cognitive basis of creative 
achievements or the mental operations that are involved in bringing about 
creative outcomes. 
One of the earliest accounts that emphasized cognitive processes in 
creative thinking was formulated by J.P. Guilford (1950), a pioneer in the field of 
creativity. Guilford took a person-centered approach to creativity stressing that 
the creative person possesses a variety of certain traits. In his “structure-of-
intellect” model that identifies different factors contributing to human thinking, 
Guilford introduced two groups of factors as being important for the production of 
ideas and solutions (Guilford, 1956), convergent thinking factors and divergent 
thinking factors. Whereas convergent thinking entails that cognitive efforts are 
geared towards reaching one single correct solution to a given problem, 
divergent thinking refers to an open-ended, more flexible thinking process that is 
not directed at leading to one specific solution, but is instead aimed at the 
production of many possible solutions with differing degrees of relevance to a 
problem. Within the divergent thinking component which he regarded as vital for 
creative thinking, Guilford (1968) identified four factors: fluency, referring to the 
number of produced ideas or solutions; flexibility which concerns the ability to 
overcome one’s established course of thinking to arrive at an unusual solution; 
originality, describing the novelty and unusualness of ideas or solutions; and 
elaboration, referring to the degree of details with which one’s ideas or solutions 
are provided.  
Another early account that focused on individual differences in information 
processing as pivotal for the ability to be creative was described by S. Mednick 
(1962). The approach is grounded on the assumption that information within 
memory is represented through conceptual nodes which, in turn, are organized in 
semantic networks (Collins & Loftus, 1975). The nodes in the network represent 
different word meanings that are interconnected through associations of differing 
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strength to form a conceptual network. The strength of the connection and the 
distance between these nodes depend on their semantic and associative 
relations. When a conceptual node is activated, activation spreads to other nodes 
in the network, with more closely associated nodes being more likely reached by 
the activation than distantly related ones. Based on this semantic network theory, 
Mednick postulated that the creative process involves combining associative 
elements, or nodes, to form something new. According to his theory, a creative 
outcome is most likely achieved when elements that are only distantly associated 
in the semantic network are combined. A creative outcome was defined by the 
originality, as determined by the probability of the occurrence in a given 
population, and its usefulness, a definition that is in accordance with the 
conceptual definition that researchers follow today. Mednick hypothesized that an 
individual’s associative hierarchies determine the likelihood of producing a 
creative outcome (Mednick, 1962). Creative individuals are assumed to differ in 
the style in which their associative networks are organized. Individuals with a 
lower level of creativity possess a steep associative hierarchy, meaning that their 
associative network is organized in such a way that a conceptual node has only 
very few but strongly associated nodes connected to it which leads to the 
production of associative combinations that lie close together in their associative 
structure, but seldom generate original combinations. In comparison, the 
associative hierarchy of creative individuals is organized in a flat manner with 
nodes in their conceptual networks being strongly connected to both closely and 
distantly related nodes. Creative individuals initially produce combinations at a 
lower rate but more often come up with responses to a stimulus that draw from 
two only distantly related elements. Both non-creative and creative individuals 
will produce conventional elements that are strongly associated first, creative 
individuals, however, are able to overcome the conventional answers quickly and 
produce something more creative.   
The Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962), as a measure of 
individual differences in creativity, utilizes the ability to overcome conventional 
and dominant answers. Individuals are presented with three words, e.g. "rat", 
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"cottage" and "blue" and asked to find a fourth word acting as an associative link 
between them. The answer to the given problem being "cheese", it becomes 
apparent that the words differ in the strength of their associative connection to 
the target word. Whereas "cottage" and "blue" share a stronger associative 
connection to the target word, "rat" is only distantly related to "cheese" making it 
necessary to go beyond conventional answers. In conclusion, within Mednick's 
theoretical framework, an individual’s ability to be creative is limited by the 
organization of his associative networks and by his ability to produce a large 
number of combinations that exceed the dominant stereotypical and closely 
related responses. Newer research by Benedek and Neubauer (2013) 
challenged and attempted to empirically test Mednick's theory by mapping 
associative hierarchies of high and low creative individuals through a continuous 
free association test. Their results did not support Mednick's notion of differences 
in associative hierarchies between high and low creative individuals. High 
creative individuals are rather characterized by higher associative fluency and 
the emergence of more uncommon and creative responses (Benedek & 
Neubauer, 2013). 
 Mendelsohn (1976) took Mednick's theoretical deliberations one step 
further by demonstrating that the type of attentional focus plays an important role 
for the production of a creative solution. Focus of attention refers to the subjects 
or events that one's limited cognitive resources are directed at. Here, again, 
individual differences are at play, determining the focus of one’s attention. 
Creative individuals approach a problem with a defocused attention, meaning 
that they are able to widen their attention and to keep multiple subjects or events 
in their attentional focus at the same time, whereas people with a narrow 
attentional focus can attend to only a limited number of subjects or events. As 
creative ideas emerge from the combination of different elements to form 
something novel, a widened attentional focus, or defocused attention, makes it 
possible to attend to more elements simultaneously, thereby increasing the 
chances to produce a creative combination. Individuals that are less creative, on 
the other hand, possess a focused attentional capacity that only allows them to 
 14 
concentrate on a few elements at a time, thereby limiting the number of possible 
combinations resulting from these elements.  
Both theories see individual differences in the activation of distantly related 
elements as responsible for the differing degrees of creativity in people. Whereas 
Mednick’s account highlights individual differences in the architecture of one’s 
associative conceptual networks as determining the likelihood of a creative 
outcome, Mendelsohn stresses the differences in the manner in which elements 
can be retrieved from these networks and attended to as important to produce 
creative responses.  
 
 
2.2.2 The creative cognition approach 
 
Whereas the above described early accounts on creativity focused on explaining 
individual differences in creative ability, the creative cognition approach takes a 
different approach. Instead of confining the focus of interest on individual 
differences in creativity, the creative cognition approach takes a qualitatively 
different stand by postulating that creativity is based on a magnitude of cognitive 
processes that are recruited in a certain manner to work together and produce a 
creative outcome (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). As 
opposed to the wide-spread belief that creativity is inherent to only a few gifted 
individuals and cannot be quantified, the creative cognition approach postulates 
that creativity arises from fundamental cognitive processes shared by most 
humans and can therefore be investigated. In this manner, the creative cognition 
approach accounts not only for achievements that are ordinarily viewed as being 
creative and innovative, such as inventions or different forms of artistic 
expressions, but also for more commonplace outcomes of generative cognitive 
processes, such as every-day language use or the ability to construe concepts 
(Ward et al., 1999). The likelihood of and variability in creative achievement 
stems from individual variability in how and to what extent these processes are 
available, recruited and combined (Ward et al., 1999; Ward & Kolomyts, 2010). 
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The Geneplore model as a framework within the creative cognition approach and 
described by Finke and colleagues (1992) does not assume the presence of a 
“creative process” per se, but rather takes a look at the cognitive operations 
forming the very complex construct that is creativity.  
 According to the Geneplore model, creativity involves different stages that 
recruit different processes. The first stage consists of generative processes that 
lead to a pool of initial ideas and possible solutions or “preinventive structures”, 
whereas the second phase of creativity is made up of exploratory processes. 
Preinventive structures can be seen as incomplete ideas, proposals or possible 
candidates for a solution. Exploratory processes are needed to further explore 
and evaluate these preinventive structures to determine their usefulness for the 
problem or task at hand. The stages of creativity do not elapse in a linear 
manner. Instead, the stages follow a circular course in which the generative 
stage can follow the exploratory stage to modify and refine the initially generated 
ideas after their first evaluation deems them to be inappropriate or ill-conceived. 
This cycle repeats until the final outcome is evaluated as fitting for the task at 
hand (Ward et al., 1999).  
 Moreover, Ritter, van Baaren and Dijksterhuis (2012) showed that the 
processes involved in the evaluation of preinventive structures are not limited to 
the conscious realm. In this study, participants were better at recognizing their 
most and least creative ideas after a period of unconscious thought. The 
generation of ideas, on the contrary, did not profit from unconscious thought, as 
participants did not produce a greater number of creative ideas after unconscious 
versus conscious thought. The study thus showed that both conscious and 
unconscious processes contribute to creative performance.  
 The stages of creative production postulated in the Geneplore model 
comply with the common definition of creativity through its two core features. 
Generative processes lead to preinventive structures that are certainly novel and 
original and to some extent appropriate (Ward et al., 1999). The model, however, 
does not only involve feedback loops between the two stages, but also 
constraining factors that have to be considered as influencing the outcome of 
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creative production. Whereas constraints during exploratory processes are 
primarily linked to the practicality of the generated ideas and solutions for the 
task at hand, constraints occurring in the generative phase are of a diverse 
nature. Most simply, constraints on cognitive capacity can hinder the production 
of preinventive structures.  
 Other constraints during generative processes stem from an individual’s 
tendency to take the “path-of-least-resistance” approach to problems and tasks. 
The path-of-least-resistance refers to an individual’s preference for effortless 
information processing. Within creative thinking, this tendency reveals itself, for 
example, during retrieval of information from long-term memory. When faced with 
a task that requires coming up with something novel, individuals often rely on 
retrieving very specific instances from a certain domain as opposed to more 
general and abstract ones which would be better suited as a basis for creative 
outcomes. For example, if asked to create a new type of sitting furniture, people 
will likely retrieve a very specific exemplar of e.g., a chair instead of coming up 
with more general or abstract features that make a chair a piece of furniture one 
can sit on. Retrieval of specific instances limits the possibilities to produce 
something original due to the constraints of the retrieved specific features that 
might not be easily modified in a suitable way to fit the given problem. In the case 
of the chair, people might retrieve an example of a chair that they have 
previously seen and are thus unable to overcome this chair's specific features 
and appearance, consisting in e.g., four legs, two armrests and a high back. 
However, if relying on more abstract instances retrieved from memory, the 
outcome may be more original but might lack appropriateness (Ward, 2008). This 
tendency to take the path of least resistance is predominant in people’s 
information processing and requires effort to overcome.  
 Constraints brought about by recently given examples to a task can also 
be explained by the path-of-least-resistance approach. When individuals are 
given examples of instances they are asked to generate, they use many of the 
previously seen features in their own creations due to the inability to overcome 
this recently activated knowledge (Abraham & Windmann, 2007; Smith, Ward, & 
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Schumacher, 1993). A study by Smith and colleagues (1993) investigated how 
providing participants with examples influenced their generation of ideas for a 
new toy. Participants that had been shown examples prior to executing the task 
were found to more likely use features from the previously encountered 
examples in their own designs than participants that had not seen any examples. 
However, the restriction posed by the given examples is not entirely 
disadvantageous for the generation of new ideas. Whereas the produced ideas 
are generally lacking in originality and novelty due to the transfer of features seen 
in the examples, reliance on previously seen examples can lead to an increase in 
practicality of the generated ideas. In a study by Ward (2008) in which 
participants were instructed to create a new sport, participants’ creation that they 
reported as being based on specific exemplars were rated as more playable than 
creations from participants that relied on more abstract instances. This indicates 
that in some cases the reliance on specific instances or recently activated 
knowledge causes a negative correlation between originality and practicability of 
the generated outcomes. Whether this inverse relation between innovation and 
relevance constitutes a disadvantage strongly depends on the task or problem 
that needs to be solved. For some problems, it might be more suitable to find a 
solution that focuses on the applicability of a given idea, such as might be the 
case in optimizing established products or work processes where the task is 
aimed more strongly towards the practicality of the solution and less on its 
originality.  
 Recently activated knowledge does not only assert influence through the 
difficulty to overcome constraints through encountered examples. On a more 
subtle level, knowledge structures made easily accessible through priming can 
restrict people’s ability to generate original and novel ideas. In a study conducted 
by Ward and Wickes (2009), participants that were primed with exemplars of fruit 
and tools through a pleasantness rating were more likely to use the primed items 
in a creative generation task. Additionally, the authors compared the use of items 
with high and low unprimed accessibility, finding a more frequent use of items 
that were per se highly accessible. These results indicate the equal importance 
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of stored knowledge whose retrieval depends on its associative strength and of 
knowledge that has been made temporarily more accessible for creative 
production (Ward & Wickes, 2009).  
 The creative cognition approach concerns itself with the identification of 
the fundamental cognitive processes that lie at the heart of creative outcomes. 
The cognitive processes involved cover a wide spectrum of operations ranging 
from fundamental processes necessary for almost all acts of creative thinking 
such as working memory processes, inhibitory executive control processes or 
long-term memory retrieval, to processes that are specific to the features of the 
respective creative task, such as semantic information processing when 
engaging in a task containing semantic relations. The aim of this approach is to 
investigate these cognitive processes empirically and systematically to gain a 
better understanding of creative thought. Several cognitive operations have been 
identified as playing an important role for creative thinking. The following section 
introduces one of these processes and its importance as a basis for the present 
work. 
 
 
2.3 Conceptual expansion - a core process in creative thinking  
 
Apart from more general cognitive processes that are relevant to almost all 
modes of creative thinking, such as working memory and executive control 
functions, the creative cognition approach has identified a number of other 
cognitive operations which play an important role for some forms of creative 
thinking and are to a greater extent task-specific. These cognitive processes 
include analogy, creative imagery and conceptual combination (Ward & 
Kolomyts, 2010). 
 When discussing cognitive processes that play a role in creative thinking, 
insight takes a special place and therefore deserves a brief introduction within 
this context. Insight is not a single cognitive operation but rather one type of 
problem solving consisting of different underlying processes. Since insight bears 
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the potential to produce original ideas, as can be seen in historical accounts on 
ground-breaking inventions or discoveries (e.g., Andreasen, 2006; Ward et al., 
1999), and is associated with creative thinking (Schooler & Melcher, 1995), it 
certainly deserves mention among cognitive operations playing a role in 
creativity. Insight solutions are usually characterized by an impasse in the 
problem solving process and the sudden experience of the solution to a given 
problem accompanied by an “Aha” - effect. Solving a problem with insight 
requires cognitive restructuring and flexibility (e.g., Chein, Weisberg, Streeter, & 
Kwok, 2010; Weisberg, 1995) making it a possible source for creative thinking.  
 One of the most important cognitive processes from which creativity 
arises, however, is conceptual expansion, on which the research at the center of 
this work focuses. Concepts and hence conceptual expansion are terms that 
arise from theories on how general knowledge about the world or, in particular, 
objects, people and word meanings are represented in memory. Concepts are 
mental representations of ideas, objects, people, and so on that contain 
structured knowledge and typical exemplars of the represented matter. A myriad 
of theories exists on how semantic knowledge is organized in the brain. One of 
the oldest and most influential theories (see also section 2.2.1) proposes that 
semantic knowledge is organized in the form of associative networks (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975). Concepts and their properties are represented through conceptual 
nodes that are connected with each other to form a semantic network. The 
strength of the connection and the distance between two interconnected nodes 
depends on the semantic and associative relationship between the respective 
nodes. The closer two concepts are semantically related, the closer they are in 
the semantic network. If one concept is activated the activation spreads to 
neighboring nodes which, in turn, become active, as well. Neighboring 
conceptual nodes are more likely to be activated if they are semantically closely 
related to the initially activated concept. For example, when one thinks of a 
house, features such as windows, doors, walls, or a roof in a certain shape will 
be activated as well.  
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 Newer theories on how concepts are acquired and represented in the 
brain are mostly based on research on patients with category-specific deficits 
and can be broadly categorized as belonging to two different groups 
(Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Romani, 1990; Mahon & Caramazza, 2009). The 
first group of theories centers on neural structures as a means to organize 
conceptual knowledge. These neural structure theories are based on the 
assumption that conceptual knowledge is organized in modality-specific systems. 
More specifically, conceptual knowledge can be stored as sensory/perceptual or 
functional/associative (e.g., Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). The second group of 
theories focuses on the correlated structure principle and argues that concepts 
are organized in a way that represents the co-occurrence of certain features in 
the world (e.g., Caramazza et al., 1990). Features and characteristics that more 
frequently occur together are stored in the same semantic subsystem (for a more 
thorough review on the different theories, see Mahon & Caramazza, 2009).  
 Regardless of the underlying theories on how conceptual knowledge is 
organized, conceptual expansion refers to one’s ability to widen the limits of an 
existing conceptual representation to include new features, properties or 
exemplars in it. The retrieval of existing concepts and the expansion of their 
representations can build the ground for the generation of novel and original 
preinventive structures, but can also potentially inhibit creative generation if, for 
instance, people are unable to overcome fixation on concrete exemplars (Ward 
et al., 1999). One of the most influential series of studies on conceptual 
expansion and its implications is the structured imagination task developed by 
Ward (1994). In the task, participants are asked to imagine a creature from a 
planet that is very dissimilar to earth. Participants’ drawings of their imagined 
creatures are rated as novel depending on their similarity to earth creatures with 
deviations regarding physical symmetry, organs and appendices receiving higher 
originality ratings. Analyses of the figures drawn by participants revealed that the 
creatures they generated shared many features such as bilateral symmetry, 
organs and appendices with typical earth animals.  
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 Similar results were obtained by a second study in which participants were 
assigned to conditions stating that the creature they were to imagine had either 
feathers, fur or lived under water (Ward, 1994; experiment 2). In this case, 
participants were more likely to include attributes associated with feather, fur or 
under-water living in their designs. For instance, participants that were told the 
creature they were to imagine had feathers, more likely included wings and 
beaks in their designs. These findings indicate that participants depend on 
structured knowledge and concrete concept exemplars when generating new 
ideas. Ward (1994) interprets his findings in terms of the path-of-least-resistance 
approach. Participants prefer effortless information processing and rely on 
features and properties of familiar concept exemplars or instances and transfer 
them to their new designs, resulting in a lack of originality. Under certain 
circumstances, however, participants are able to circumvent the notion of relying 
on specific instances. When forced to access more general and abstract 
knowledge, as when faced with the task to draw an animal living under conditions 
that they likely do not have structured knowledge about, participants were able to 
come up with innovative and original figures (Ward, 1994; experiment 3). 
Ward’s initial findings on the reliance on concept exemplars not only show 
possible constraints for creative innovation but also shed light on the conditions 
under which existing concepts can be expanded to generate novel and 
innovative ideas. This task created by Ward is only one of many still used to 
assess conceptual expansion in creativity research. Another task that is applied 
to measure conceptual expansion and possible constraints on this cognitive 
process requires participants to create a novel toy out of three elements (Smith 
et al., 1993). The task and the effects of giving examples prior to the execution of 
the task have been described in detail earlier (see section 2.2.2).  
A third task that requires the expansion of existing concepts and hence is 
used as a measure of creativity is the Alternate Uses Task (AUT; Wallach & 
Kogan, 1965). In this task, participants are asked to create as many novel uses 
as possible for a given object in a fixed timeframe. Participants' responses are 
rated according to their fluency, or the number of different uses generated for an 
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object, and their originality, or uniqueness of the generated use. This task 
requires participants to activate existing concepts, such as a shoe, and its 
accompanying features that dictate its uses. The features of a shoe, for example, 
are strongly linked to its uses as foot protection or as a means to smash insects 
on the ground. In order to generate novel uses for an object, participants 
therefore have to overcome these more obvious uses and expand their existing 
concept of a shoe. A relatively novel and unique use for a shoe, drawing from its 
shape that resembles a vessel with a top opening, would be its use as a flower 
pot.  
 
 
2.4 Creativity and Neurophysiology 
 
While creativity research was mostly limited to behavioral studies investigating 
creative idea generation in terms of its constraints, implications and contributing 
factors, the rise of neuroimaging and neurophysiological techniques opened up 
opportunities to investigate creativity from a new angle. Event-related potentials 
and functional magnetic resonance imaging are two methods that can be 
employed to explore creative cognitive processes and their neural correlates.  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is based on the 
association between neural activity and increased cerebral blood flow due to 
metabolic changes in activated brain areas. fMRI is based on the differing 
magnetic properties of oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin. When a brain 
area is activated, more oxygenated blood is transported to this area and leads to 
a change in the MR signal. More specifically, hydrogen protons, whose 
endogenous spin gives them magnetic properties are deflected from their 
naturally occurring randomly distributed orientation by exposing them to a strong 
external electromagnetic field in the scanner. The protons absorb the energy of a 
second magnetic field, a B1 or radio frequency pulse, and release it again after 
its termination causing the protons to return to their original orientation. The 
thereby emitted electrical field is measured as the MR signal. In the case of 
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functional MRI, the different magnetic properties of oxygenated and 
deoxygenated hemoglobin are taken advantage of to generate the blood oxygen 
level dependence (BOLD) signal with an increase in BOLD signal indicating an 
increase of oxygenated blood flow to the activated area. fMRI captures the time-
course of this hemodynamic response (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2009; 
Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2009). The use of fMRI offers many advantages such 
as high spatial resolution and the possibility to observe neural activation that is 
not limited to the cortical areas of the brain. This method, however, also holds an 
important disadvantage, namely its temporal solution. Due to the physiological 
processes that lead to the BOLD response, its peak is temporally delayed from 
the onset of the event that triggered it, therefore making it unsuitable to measure 
neural activity brought about by events occurring close to each other. 
Whereas fMRI only allows for the indirect measurement of neural activity 
through the BOLD response, electroencephalography (EEG) measures brain 
activity directly through the recording of postsynaptic electrical potentials through 
electrodes applied to the scalp. When a group of neurons are active at the same 
time due to cognitive operations, the electrical potentials become large enough to 
be measured as voltage changes that directly reflect differences in the potential 
measured by active electrodes and a predetermined reference electrode. Event-
related potentials (ERPs) are changes in the continuous EEG signal that occur 
as a response to a certain stimulus or event. In relation to the onset of an event, 
different components can be identified that are characteristic for certain 
underlying cognitive processes (Luck, 2005). ERPs offer advantages such as a 
high temporal resolution and the possibility of continuously measuring cognitive 
processes occurring as a response to an event. The main disadvantage of the 
method lies in its poor spatial resolution, as the localization of the source of any 
given ERP pattern is difficult.  
The following section will give an overview of previous research on 
creativity using ERPs and neuroimaging methods and their respective drawbacks 
and limitations. 
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2.4.1 Findings from neuroimaging studies 
 
The advances in neuroimaging technology over the last decades made it 
possible to investigate creativity at its origin by uncovering some of the neural 
correlates of creative thinking. Even though, the present work focuses on fMRI as 
one neuroimaging method to measure creativity, the following overview also 
includes findings from other neuroimaging techniques to draw a more complete 
picture of the respective findings. 
Studies on creativity and its neural basis span a wide range of possible 
investigative issues. Some studies focus on the connection between cortical 
thickness and different creative measures (e.g., Jung et al., 2010; Jung, Mead, 
Carrasco, & Flores, 2013) or the role of white or gray matter for creative 
achievement (Takeuchi et al., 2010a; Takeuchi et al., 2010b). The majority of 
studies, however, concentrate primarily on the importance of different brain 
regions on creative thinking. Unfortunately, the existing studies on creativity have 
not led to the isolation of a few brain areas involved in creative thinking. Apart 
from studies on insight (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan, & Iacoboni, 2009; Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Luo, Niki, & Phillips, 2004; 
Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2009) which consistently 
showed the involvement of bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; BA 45), anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 9, 24 and 32) and superior temporal gyrus (STG; BA 
21 and 22) or temporal pole (BA 38), findings from studies on creativity differ with 
regard to the brain regions involved.  
One of the earliest studies that focused on differences between high and 
low creative individuals by Carlsson, Wendt and Risberg (2000) showed cerebral 
blood flow (CBF) differences. The researchers reported an increased activation 
in anterior and superior prefrontal and fronto-temporal regions when performing a 
creative task versus a fluency task or automatic speech. Highly creative 
individuals differed from low creative individuals only in superior frontal regions 
by showing a left hemispheric asymmetry.  
In a similar manner, Chavez-Eakle and colleagues investigated cerebral 
blood flow differences between high and low creative individuals while they 
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performed two creativity tasks (Chavez-Eakle, Graff-Guerrero, Garcia-Reyna, 
Vaugier, & Cruz-Fuentes, 2007). Their results revealed greater CBF for highly 
creative individuals in a range of prefrontal areas, such as the right precentral 
gyrus (BA 6), bilateral middle frontal gyrus (BA 6 and BA 10), left inferior frontal 
gyrus (BA 47), as well as in the right cerebellum and in temporal regions (BA 38).  
While the aforementioned studies mainly looked at the individual 
differences between high and low creative individuals and the arising differences 
in brain activation, other studies put an emphasis on the common neural 
correlates of cognitive processes underlying creativity regardless of individual 
differences in underlying creative ability. 
In one of theses studies, Howard-Jones and colleagues (Howard-Jones, 
Blakemore, Samuel, Summers, & Claxton, 2005) had participants imagine stories 
from related or unrelated word sets under the condition to be either creative or 
uncreative. The results revealed greater activation in the right medial frontal 
gyrus (BA 9/10), as well as in the left ACC (BA 9/32) when comparing creative 
versus uncreative story generation. Additionally, the authors reported greater 
activation in the right medial gyrus (BA 9/10) when the participants used related 
as opposed to unrelated words when asked to be creative rather than uncreative. 
In a positron emission tomography (PET) study by Bechtereva and 
colleagues (Bechtereva et al., 2000) participants executed four tasks with 
differing levels of difficulty. Participants were required to generate a story from 
semantically distant words, create a story from semantically related words, 
reconstruct a given story or memorize a set of words. When contrasting the 
distantly and closely related story generation tasks, greater activation could be 
observed in the right superior frontal gyrus (BA 10), right mediofrontal gyrus (BA 
11) and right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45). Contrasting the distantly related story 
generation task with the reconstructing task resulted in greater activation in the 
left superior frontal and mediofrontal (BA 8) gyri, as well as the left cingulate 
gyrus (BA 32) and cuneus (BA 19) and precuneus (BA 7). Compared to the 
memorizing task, the distantly related story generation produced greater 
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activation in bilateral IFG (BA 45/47), the left mediofrontal and mediotemporal 
gyri (BA 9, BA 21 and 39), as well as in the cuneus (BA 19).  
Fink and colleagues conducted two studies to investigate possible 
underlying brain regions for creative tasks (Fink et al., 2009; Fink et al., 2010). In 
the first of these studies, the researchers compared brain activity during the 
Alternate Uses task with an Object Characteristics task (in which participants had 
to think of typical characteristics of common everyday objects, such as "leathery" 
or "matched" for "shoe") and found stronger activation in the left angular gyrus for 
the Alternate Uses task (Fink et al., 2009; experiment 2). In a later study, they 
investigated how brain activity changed when participants received cognitive 
stimulation in form of exposure to other people’s ideas (Fink et al., 2010). When 
comparing the Alternate Uses with the Object Characteristics task, greater 
activation of the left supramarginal gyrus could be observed. When comparing 
activation for the Alternate Uses task before and after participants received 
external cognitive stimulation, cognitive stimulation resulted in greater activation 
in the right posterior cingulate gyrus, bilateral precuneus, right middle temporal 
gyrus, right angular gyrus, medial orbitofrontal gyrus, as well as medial superior 
frontal gyrus. 
In a more recent study, Benedek and colleagues compared creative idea 
generation with the mere retrieval of old ideas (Benedek et al., 2013). In the 
study, participants completed a self-paced Alternate Uses task and indicated 
afterwards whether their responses represented old or new ideas. The results 
showed that divergent thinking as measured by the Alternate Uses task led to 
activation in the left IFG and parts of the superior frontal gyrus (SFG), as well as 
in areas of the medial temporal lobe and the medial part of the precentral gyrus. 
When comparing the generation of new ideas to the mere recall of old ideas, new 
idea generation was associated with activation in the left inferior parietal cortex 
and the left supramarginal gyrus. 
When bringing together the findings from the aforementioned studies on 
creativity, it is readily apparent that there does not seem to be a consistent 
pattern of activated brain areas associated with creative cognition. The findings 
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rather reveal a myriad of possible neural correlates for creativity spanning almost 
the entire prefrontal cortex and other brain regions (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). This 
inconsistency in creativity research findings is due to different reasons. Some of 
the reasons are of methodological nature and stem from drawbacks of imaging 
techniques for the investigation of creative thinking that will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
 
2.4.2 Limitations of neuroimaging studies 
 
Although the rise of neuroimaging techniques offers the possibility to investigate 
creativity at its core, there are a number of limitations that need to be taken into 
consideration (Abraham, 2013). 
 Due to the high sensitivity of imaging methods to movement artefacts, 
especially of the head, many of the creativity tasks used under behavioral 
experimental settings are insufficient for use in neuroimaging studies. Creativity 
tasks often involve expressing one’s generated ideas verbally or through writing 
or drawing. Some studies avoid the problem of movement artefacts by asking 
participants to generate ideas during the scanning period and to recall them from 
memory after the scanning session (e.g., Howard-Jones et al., 2005). This 
approach, however, poses only a suboptimal alternative to traditional creativity 
tasks as participants are prone to recall and memory biases limiting the reliability 
of their accounts. Participants may forget what they generated during the 
experiment (Wixted, 2004) or add details, thereby falsifying their initially 
generated ideas.  
Additional problems arise from timing issues. The open-ended nature of 
creativity tasks together with long trial durations used by many researchers 
makes it almost impossible to time-lock the onset of a creative process to a 
certain stimulus or response (e.g., Fink et al., 2009; Howard-Jones et al., 2005). 
In the case of Howard-Jones et al.’s story generation task, one trial lasted 22 s 
during which a variety of cognitive processes may take place making it 
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impossible to determine their specific onsets. Another drawback lies in the 
relatively small number of trials that can be applied in a neuroimaging setting, so 
as not to overstretch time that participants spend in the scanner. For instance, 
Fink and colleagues (2009) assessed four conditions with only 8 trials per 
condition in their experiment. Having a relatively small number of trials may lead 
to a loss of statistical power and increases the chance of possible effects 
remaining undetected.  
Further drawbacks of previous studies that might be responsible for the 
heterogeneous findings lie in the deficit of sufficient control tasks that the 
creativity tasks can be contrasted with. Bechtereva and colleagues (2000) 
contrasted their story generation task with a word memorizing task, which is 
hardly comparable in difficulty. Moreover, memorizing a word list certainly 
recruits a whole set of different cognitive processes than are required for the 
completion of a generative task involving distantly related words. This lack of 
discriminatory power of the control task makes it impossible to detect neural 
correlates of creative cognitive processes.  
The reason that probably accounts most for the unsatisfactorily 
inconsistent results of previous neuroimaging studies of creativity is the treatment 
of creativity as a single unitary construct (e.g., Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich & Kanso, 
2010). Even though the creative cognition approach postulates that creativity 
requires the involvement of many fundamental cognitive processes (e.g., Finke et 
al., 1992), studies with the objective to investigate creative cognition fail to view 
creativity as a complex construct. By treating creativity in such a way, 
researchers do not consider that the experimental creativity tasks they are 
applying involve not only one but many cognitive processes that only partially 
overlap between different tasks. This failure to concentrate on the differentiable 
cognitive processes that lie at the core of creative thinking results in 
heterogeneous findings that unfortunately only limitedly illuminate the neural 
underpinnings of creative thinking.  
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2.4.3 Findings from ERP studies 
 
While electroencephalography (EEG) has been widely used in the investigation 
of creativity, event-related potentials (ERP) in particular have rarely been 
employed for the same. 
A fair amount of studies using EEG frequency band differences between 
task types or between participants differing in creativity scores have been 
conducted (e.g., Fink et al., 2009; Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; for an overview 
see Dietrich & Kanso, 2010 and Fink & Benedek, 2013). The study conducted by 
Fink and colleagues (2009) using a creative idea generation task revealed that 
the generation of original ideas is associated with heightened alpha 
synchronization over frontal areas of the brain. When taking individual 
differences into account, participants that produced highly original ideas showed 
greater alpha synchronization over parietal areas, as well. Similar results were 
found in a study by Fink, Graif, & Neubauer (2009) when they compared 
performances in an imagined improvisation dance and in the Alternate Uses task 
between professional and novice dancers. Professional dancers showed stronger 
alpha synchronization in parietal areas of the brain than novices. When imagining 
an improvised dance, stronger alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere 
could be observed in professional dancers as compared to the novices.  
The field of research on insight in creative thinking has been the subject of 
a number of EEG and ERP studies. The focus has been limited to frequency 
band activity and ERP components associated with insight (e.g., Jung-Beeman 
et al., 2004; Qiu et al., 2008; for an overview see Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). 
However, there are no studies so far that investigated the association between 
ERP components and other creative cognitive operations in a creativity task. This 
is surprising considering the advantages that ERP investigations offer. For one, 
ERPs allow for a high temporal resolution which makes it possible to time-lock 
stimulus or response onsets more accurately to underlying brain activity, giving 
this method an advantage over fMRI which relies on the slow temporal resolution 
of the BOLD response. Additionally, ERPs are associated with distinct cognitive 
processes offering the opportunity to investigate their respective onsets and 
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temporal distributions. These advantages make ERPs a suitable instrument for 
investigating creative thinking. 
 
 
2.4.4 The present studies: Neural correlates of conceptual expansion 
 
Introducing a new approach to investigate creative thinking 
When summing up the existing neuroscientific research on creativity, it becomes 
apparent that there is abundant room for improvement to arrive at a better 
understanding of the neural correlates of creative thinking. Whereas findings 
concerning creative cognitive processes measured by way of ERPs are still 
missing entirely, results from fMRI and other neuroimaging studies draw a very 
heterogeneous picture of brain areas possibly involved in creative thinking.  
The present work therefore follows three main objectives. The first 
objective concerns the problem of conceptualizing creativity as a single unitary 
construct and the thereof resulting inconsistent findings. The present studies are 
aimed at avoiding these issues by adopting a new perspective on creativity, 
viewing it as a construct involving different cognitive processes. Tying into this 
first objective, the second goal of the present work is to improve the many 
methodological issues arising when applying creativity tasks in a neuroscientific 
setting. As a last objective, one of the studies presented in this work is aimed at 
investigating creative thinking through ERPs, an attempt that has not been made 
so far. To meet these three main goals it is necessary to choose a new approach 
towards investigating creativity.  
The approach adopted in the present work tries to overcome the general 
notion of creativity studies that views creativity as a unitary construct without 
disentangling the fundamental cognitive processes it possibly involves. Following 
the creative cognition approach and its postulations, the presented studies focus 
on one cognitive process thought to be vital for producing a creative outcome, 
namely conceptual expansion. Concentrating on one core process allows for a 
more distinct association between a cognitive process of interest and the 
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respective brain areas and ERP components it recruits and is associated with. 
Previous studies on creativity used tasks that involved a variety of different 
cognitive processes, as can be seen, for instance, in the story generation task 
applied by Howard-Jones and colleagues (2005). When generating a story, 
participants recruit a number of cognitive operations ranging from working 
memory and other executive functioning operations to memory retrieval. Next to 
these cognitive operations that very likely occur for all participants, the 
recruitment of other cognitive operations to meet the goal of generating a 
creative story might differ between individual participants. In this manner, a 
creative story can arise from conceptual combination or conceptual expansion, 
as well as from analogy. Focusing instead on one individual creative cognitive 
process, such as conceptual expansion, would enable one to uncover the neural 
structures underlying this cognitive operation. 
The second goal of the presented work is to investigate creativity while 
avoiding pitfalls of earlier neuroimaging studies on the subject. The greatest 
methodological issues in creativity research in neuroimaging settings are, as 
discussed above, long trial durations, relatively small numbers of trials, the lack 
of knowledge about the onset of a creative process, the difficulties associated 
with recording vocal or drawn responses, as well as suboptimal control 
conditions to contrast the experimental task with. These problems often arise 
when assessing creativity through a task that requires active generation from 
participants. In the case of conceptual expansion, one example for an active task 
is the one by Ward (1994) that asks participants to draw animals living on a 
planet different from earth. The new approach introduced in the present work 
tries to avoid the common methodological problems by assessing conceptual 
expansion through a passive task.  
Usually, individuals expand their existing concepts actively when faced 
with a problem or task that requires a creative solution. However, it is also 
possible to bring about the expansion of existing concepts passively by way of 
exposing individuals to a novel and unusual idea. While it can be argued that the 
processes involved when actively broadening the limits of existing concepts differ 
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to a great degree from those involved when conceptual expansion is passively 
induced, this argument is only partially valid. Clearly, the cognitive operations 
necessary for an active widening of concepts exceed the operations that are 
recruited when merely processing and comprehending a creative idea causing 
conceptual expansion. Active conceptual expansion will likely require additional 
processes that are unnecessary for passively expanding concepts, such as 
inhibitory control processes. The concepts that are being expanded, however, 
are the same in both types of tasks. Changes occurring to these concepts in 
terms of how they impact the conceptual networks in the brain, are therefore 
likely to be reflected by the activation of the same brain areas and by the same 
ERP components regardless of whether the expansion of concepts was self-
driven and brought about actively or passively through the exposure to a creative 
idea.  
 
 
Investigating conceptual expansion through novel metaphors 
This novel approach towards assessing creativity in a passive manner can be 
suitably operationalized by referring to existing research on semantic language 
comprehension and processing. In particular, the processing of novel metaphors 
can be viewed as a passive expansion of concepts. Metaphors unfold their effect 
through the transfer of a certain feature or characteristic over to an unrelated 
domain followed by the integration of the new feature into the domain, thereby 
arriving at a novel meaning that neither one of the single domains conveyed 
individually. When trying to make sense of novel metaphors, existing conceptual 
representations have to be widened to include a new and formerly non-
associated feature in it. "The clouds are crying over the fields" is an example for 
a novel metaphor. It can be assumed that the feature "crying" is not normally 
associated with the concept of a cloud. The concept has to be expanded to 
include this new feature in order to make sense of the metaphor. In contrast, "Her 
heart is broken" constitutes an ordinary or conventional metaphor that does not 
require conceptual expansion. Although a heart can not literally break, the 
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expression is widely used in everyday language and "heart" and "break" are 
therefore already associated with each other for most people.   
Research on novel metaphor processing has advanced quite far using 
fMRI as well as ERPs. A number of studies used fMRI to investigate which brain 
areas are activated when metaphors are processed. The studies used a variety 
of stimulus material, ranging from metaphorical word pairs (e.g., Mashal, Faust, 
& Hendler, 2005; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & Jung-Beeman, 2007) to complete 
phrases (e.g., Hillert & Buracas, 2009; Stringaris et al., 2006; Stringaris, Medford, 
Giampietro, Brammer, & David, 2007) and phrases including metaphorical 
comparisons (e.g., Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2004; Rapp, Leube, Erb, 
Grodd, & Kircher, 2007). The tasks that participants were asked to carry out in 
these fMRI studies on metaphor processing included, for instance, decisions on 
the meaningfulness of the presented material (e.g., Stringaris et al., 2007) or 
decisions on the metaphoric content of the material (e.g., Rapp et al., 2007). The 
results of the studies showed an involvement of inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; BA 44, 
45 and 47) in the processing of novel compared to conventional metaphors or 
literal stimulus material (e.g., Mashal et al., 2005; Stringaris et al., 2007; Yang, 
Edens, Simpson, & Krawczyk, 2009), as well as activation in frontopolar areas 
(BA 10; Mashal et al., 2007) and temporal brain regions (BA 19, 20, 37, 38,39 
and 42, e.g., Mashal et al., 2005; Rapp et al., 2004; Stringaris et al., 2007). A 
meta-analysis by Bohrn and colleagues (2012) investigating the neural correlates 
of figurative language across a number of fMRI studies found greater activation 
in areas such as the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG; BA 46), the left IFG (BA 
44/45/47/9/10), left inferior temporal gyrus (ITG; BA 37/21) and the left fusiform 
gyrus (BA 20) when comparing novel metaphors and literal expressions (see 
Bohrn, Altmann, & Jacobs, 2012 for a more comprehensive overview of the 
included studies and their respective results). These regions constitute part of the 
semantic cognition network of the brain (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009).  
Regarding ERP studies on the subject of metaphor processing, the 
stimulus material again covered different forms of metaphorical expressions, 
usually accompanied by the task to judge the meaningfulness (e.g., Arzouan, 
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Goldstein, & Faust, 2007; De Grauwe, Swain, Holcomb, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 
2010) and interpretability and familiarity (Lai, Curran, & Menn, 2009) of the 
presented material. When compared to conventional metaphors or literal stimulus 
material, novel metaphors were consistently associated with an increased N400 
amplitude (e.g., Arzouan et al., 2007; Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; De Grauwe 
et al., 2010). The N400 has been associated with semantic incongruities (Kutas 
& Hillyard, 1980a; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980b), violations of world knowledge or 
discourse context (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Hald, 
Steenbeek-Planting, & Hagoort, 2007; van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999) and 
the difficulty of semantic integration (e.g., Kutas & Van Petten, 1994). Some 
studies also report a greater late positive component (LPC) for metaphoric as 
compared to literal material (e.g., Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; De Grauwe et al., 
2010). The LPC has been discussed in terms of reanalysis (Friederici, 1995) and 
additional retrieval of information from semantic memory (e.g., Coulson & Van 
Petten, 2002; Paller & Kutas, 1992). 
Even though psycholinguistic studies on metaphor processing do not have 
the investigation of creative thinking as an objective, they can be modified to be 
suitable for examining conceptual expansion more closely. The present studies 
borrow from theses psycholinguistic studies by choosing novel metaphoric 
expressions as stimulus material for a passive conceptual expansion task. Since 
the main objective, however, is to draw a clearer picture of the neural correlates 
underlying creative cognitive processes, the two main characteristics of creativity, 
namely novelty and appropriateness, are considered in the task. In this manner, 
three categories of stimulus phrases were used that correspond to the possible 
combinations of novelty and appropriateness: high unusual and high appropriate 
(HUHA, novel metaphoric expressions), high unusual and low appropriate 
(HULA, nonsense expressions) and low unusual and high appropriate (LUHA, 
literal expressions). HUHA stimuli are considered to induce conceptual 
expansion and are therefore relevant to creative thinking. HULA stimuli are 
senseless as they convey something novel and original but impractical, whereas 
LUHA stimuli are common and well established in daily language use. The 
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combination of a stimulus being low unusual and low appropriate (LULA) is not 
possible, as low unusualness implies that the conceptual association is known 
and well-established and therefore automatically has to be appropriate and 
practical as well.  
Taking the present studies even one step further, the approach adopted 
here does not rely on these categories as pre-determined by the experimenter. 
Instead, the participants’ task was to judge the presented stimulus material on 
both of the two defining features of creativity: unusualness (YES if unfamiliar to 
them, NO if familiar to them) and appropriateness (YES if fitting in the given 
context, NO if unfitting in the given context), thereby making it possible to group 
the stimuli into the three categories (HUHA, HULA, LUHA) for each subject 
individually. Forming these subject-determined conditions allows for controlling 
individual differences in participants’ existing conceptual structures and their 
abilities to expand them. After all, individuals have varying notions on what they 
consider to be unusual and appropriate.  
Another novelty of the paradigm adopted in the present studies lies in the 
implementation of a passive rather than an active conceptual expansion task. By 
choosing to induce conceptual expansion passively in participants, many of the 
methodological downfalls of previous studies, such as long trial durations during 
which a myriad of cognitive processes take place, and the difficulties associated 
with verbal responses to a task can be avoided. As discussed in a previous 
section, passive conceptual expansion may not recruit the exact same cognitive 
processes found in an active conceptual expansion task, but the conceptual 
structures being widened remain the same in both types of tasks and their 
expansion should therefore lead to the activation of the same brain areas. 
 
 
fMRI: correlates of conceptual expansion 
With regard to possible candidate brain regions involved during conceptual 
expansion, it was hypothesized that conceptual expansion would result in greater 
activation in areas in the IFG (BA 45 and 47). These areas have been shown to 
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be involved in the retrieval of semantic information and the resolving of semantic 
uncertainties (e.g., Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; 
Poldrack et al., 1999; Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). 
Additional regions that were expected to be activated during conceptual 
expansion are regions in the temporal lobe, such as the middle and inferior 
temporal gyri (MTG and ITG; BA 20 and 21) and the temporal poles (BA 38). 
These temporal areas play an important role for the storage of semantic 
information (e.g., Binder et al., 2009; Lambon Ralph, Cipolotti, Manes, & 
Patterson, 2010; Lambon Ralph, Pobric, & Jefferies, 2009; Patterson, Nestor, & 
Rogers, 2007) and were therefore hypothesized to play a role during conceptual 
expansion.  
 Finally, the involvement of the frontopolar cortex (BA 10) was also 
hypothesized. The frontopolar cortex has been shown to be instrumental for the 
integration of self-generated or inferred information, as well as for the integration 
of multiple relations (e.g., Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, & Wagner, 2005; Green, 
Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 2010; Kroger et al., 2002). Processing 
HUHA sentences (novel metaphoric expressions) was assumed to require 
greater efforts to retrieve stored semantic information about the two concepts 
conveyed through them. For the existing concept to be expanded, however, it is 
necessary that the two formerly unrelated concepts and features are integrated 
and put into relation to one another.  
Sentences that are judged as novel (HUHA or novel metaphoric 
expressions and HULA or nonsense expressions) were also expected to lead to 
an increased demand in retrieving semantic information and resolving semantic 
uncertainties resulting in activations in the IFG (BA 45 and 47), as well as the 
temporal knowledge storage areas (BA 20, 21 and 38). Both types of stimuli 
convey something novel that has not been encountered before, making it 
necessary to put forth more effort in retrieving semantic information. Concerning 
sentences that are judged as appropriate (HUHA or novel metaphoric 
expressions and LUHA or literal expressions), the investigation was of an 
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explorative nature without any specific expectations regarding possibly activated 
brain regions. 
In sum, phrases involving conceptual expansion were hypothesized to 
lead to greater activation in the IFG (BA 45 and 47), the frontopolar cortex (BA 
10) and the MTG and ITG (BA 20 and 21), as well as the temporal poles (BA 38). 
Phrases conveying novelty were hypothesized to result in the activation of the 
IFG (BA 45 and 47) and of temporal areas (BA 20, 21 and 38), whereas the 
investigation of phrases judged as appropriate was purely explorative.  
 
 
ERP: correlates of conceptual expansion  
For the ERP study, one ERP component was of especial interest for the 
investigation of conceptual expansion, namely the N400. The N400 component is 
a negative-going waveform that appears around 300 to 600 ms after stimulus 
onset. It is known to be modulated by a variety of stimulus features, such as 
semantic incongruity (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 1980a; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980b), 
cloze probability (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984a) or discourse context and world 
knowledge violations (e.g., Hagoort et al., 2004; Hald et al., 2007; van Berkum et 
al., 1999; van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort, & Zwitserlood, 2003). Considering that 
the N400 component is also known for indexing the difficulty of semantic 
information retrieval from memory storage (e.g., Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; 
Kutas, Van Petten, & Kluender, 2006), it was expected that HULA sentences 
(nonsense expressions) result in the greatest N400 amplitude, followed by HUHA 
sentences (novel metaphoric expressions) and LUHA sentences (literal 
expressions). HULA sentences (nonsense expressions) are unusual, but at the 
same time meaningless which should have the greatest effect on the N400 
component, as they require more effort to retrieve semantic information about the 
involved concepts. HUHA phrases (novel metaphoric expressions), in 
comparison, should require less effort to retrieve semantic information than 
HULA phrases (nonsense expressions), but still to a greater extent than LUHA 
phrases (literal expressions). As creative thinking has not been investigated by 
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means of ERPs so far, the possible effect of creative sentences on later ERP 
components remained unclear at this point.  
 
In sum, the present studies adopt a new approach to investigate one creative 
cognitive operation, namely conceptual expansion, with fMRI and ERP. To avoid 
drawbacks and problems of previous studies, this new approach adapts 
experimental paradigms from metaphor processing studies to incorporate a 
passive conceptual expansion task fitted to take into account individual variations 
in the organization of conceptual knowledge by relying on subject-determined 
conditions. 
The following sections describe the fMRI and ERP studies with their 
respective hypotheses, procedures and results regarding the neural correlates of 
creative thinking. 
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3 Study 1 
Can clouds dance? Neural correlates of passive 
conceptual expansion using a metaphor processing 
task: Implications for creative cognition1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Publication: Rutter, B., Kröger, S., Stark, R., Schweckendiek, J., Windmann, S., Hermann, C., & 
Abraham, A. (2012), Brain and Cognition, 78, 114-122.  
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3.1 Abstract 
 
Creativity has emerged in the focus of neurocognitive research in the past 
decade. However, a heterogeneous pattern of brain areas has been implicated 
as underpinning the neural correlates of creativity. One explanation for these 
divergent findings lies in the fact that creativity is not usually investigated in terms 
of its many underlying cognitive processes. The present fMRI study focuses on 
the neural correlates of conceptual expansion, a central component of all creative 
processes. The study aims to avoid pitfalls of previous fMRI studies on creativity 
by employing a novel paradigm. Participants were presented with phrases and 
made judgments regarding both the unusualness and the appropriateness of the 
stimuli, corresponding to the two defining criteria of creativity. According to their 
respective evaluation, three subject-determined experimental conditions were 
obtained. Phrases judged as both unusual and appropriate were classified as 
indicating conceptual expansion in participants. The findings reveal the 
involvement of frontal and temporal regions when engaging in passive 
conceptual expansion as opposed to the information processing of mere 
unusualness (novelty) or appropriateness (relevance). Taking this new 
experimental approach to uncover specific processes involved in creative 
cognition revealed that frontal and temporal regions known to be involved in 
semantic cognition and relational reasoning play a role in passive conceptual 
expansion. Adopting a different vantage point on the investigation of creativity 
would allow for critical advances in future research on this topic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
3.2 Introduction 
 
Creativity is one of the most complex cognitive abilities in human adaptive 
behaviour. Despite many discrepancies between experts on what makes an idea 
or product creative and the more naïve concept of creativity prevalent in the 
general population, a widely accepted working definition of creativity has 
emerged among researchers (e.g., Amabile, 1990; Boden, 2003; Dietrich, 2004; 
Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Runco, 2004; 
Sternberg & Lubart, 1999; Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). According to this 
definition, an idea, concept, or solution needs to meet two important 
requirements to be classified as creative. The first requirement refers to the 
originality or uniqueness of the concept, the second one concerns its 
appropriateness or relevance. An outcome has to be both novel and fitting for the 
task at hand to be considered creative (e.g., Ward, 2007). Creative processes 
are thought to involve different stages, each of which requires the recruitment of 
many cognitive processes to solve any given task (Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999; 
Ward, 2007). However, their investigation, especially in the light of possibilities 
given through the rapid rise of neuroimaging techniques, has not advanced very 
far. Many reasons account for this impasse in creativity research.  
First of all, most creativity tasks require verbal responses from 
participants, or heavily rely on their self-reports, as is the case for the insight 
tasks where participants have to report whether or not they found the solution by 
insight (Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan, & Iacoboni, 2009; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). Using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as a mode of examination makes 
it difficult to record participants’ verbal responses during scanning due to the 
susceptibility to movement artefacts. Most studies avoid this pitfall by logging 
participants’ verbal accounts after completion of the scanning session (Howard-
Jones et al., 2005). This method, however, is associated with uncontrollable 
biases in participants’ recall or the forgetting of earlier ideas (Healy, Havas, & 
Parkar, 2000; Wixted, 2004), which can lead one to question the reliability of the 
findings. Additionally, several neuroimaging designs have long trial durations 
(e.g., 20 seconds in Chavez-Eakle, Graff-Guerrero, Garcia-Reyna, Vaugier, & 
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Cruz-Fuentes, 2007), or the processes in question are not time-locked to a 
defined stimulus or response (e.g., Fink et al., 2009), thereby making it harder to 
relate brain activations to the actual time point at which a creative process 
occurred. Furthermore, the conditions with which the creative tasks are 
contrasted often differ not only with regard to the creative processes involved, 
but, in various other aspects as well, such as task difficulty or task requirements 
(e.g., Bechtereva et al., 2000; Bechtereva, Korotkov, Pakhomov, Roudas, & 
Starchenko, 2004; Howard-Jones, Blakemore, Samuel, Summers, & Claxton, 
2005). For instance, Bechtereva and colleagues (2000) had participants create 
stories from semantically distant words and contrasted them with a word 
remembering task as a control condition. Not only do the two tasks differ in 
difficulty, as it is harder to create stories from unrelated words, the modes of the 
tasks themselves are not comparable as the mere remembering of words recruits 
a whole host of different processes when compared to the active generation of a 
novel story. Such circumstances render it challenging to interpret findings as 
creativity-specific.  
Most importantly, however, the investigation of creativity has 
conceptualized creativity not as a complex construct involving a multitude of 
cognitive processes, but has rather treated it as a singular entity (for criticism of 
this view, see Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). Apart from the cognitive 
process of insight which is defined by the sudden experience of the right solution 
during problem solving (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan, & Iacoboni, 2009; Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004), no other specific creative operation has been the target of 
concerted neuroscientific investigation. The common approach to the 
investigation of creativity is to employ divergent thinking tasks which require the 
production of multiple solutions for a problem. The specific cognitive processes 
recruited by these tasks, however, are impossible to determine because of the 
many differences between tasks and designs. The result is a number of very 
heterogeneous findings that attempt to pin down the neural correlates of 
creativity as a whole without specifying the distinct processes involved in any 
given task. The various brain regions identified across these studies span almost 
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the entire prefrontal cortex with only little overlap between studies (e.g., 
Bechtereva, Korotkov, Pakhomov, Roudas, & Starchenko, 2004; Chavez-Eakle, 
Graff-Guerrero, Garcia-Reyna, Vaugier, & Cruz-Fuentes, 2007; Fink et al., 2009; 
Howard-Jones, Blakemore, Samuel, Summers, & Claxton, 2005; for a detailed 
review, see Dietrich & Kanso, 2010).  
One possibility to avoid many of the drawbacks of previous neuroimaging 
studies would be to target specific operations of creativity individually. 
Conceptual expansion is, hereby, of particular interest for the investigation of 
creative cognition. It describes the extension of existing concepts to include new 
features and attributes, thereby widening its original definition (Abraham, 
Windmann, Daum, & Gunturkun, 2005; Abraham, Windmann, Siefen, Daum, & 
Gunturkun, 2006; Abraham & Windmann, 2007; Ward, Patterson, Sifonis, Dodds, 
& Saunders, 2002), and thus plays a crucial role in generating new ideas. As the 
behavioural tasks to assess conceptual expansion involve drawing and have no 
time constraints (e.g., Ward, 1994), they are not suitable for fMRI designs. An 
indirect approach would therefore be better suited to examine this process in an 
fMRI setting. The domain of metaphor processing offers an ideal opportunity for 
such a venture (e.g., Hillert & Buracas, 2009; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & Jung-
Beeman, 2007; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & Jung-Beeman, 2009; Rapp, Leube, 
Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2004; Stringaris, Medford, Giampietro, Brammer, & David, 
2007). Paradigms that assess novel metaphor processing where different and 
often semantically distant domains have to be integrated mentally in order to 
derive meaning are particularly relevant as they can be modified to investigate 
conceptual expansion in creative cognition. For instance, Mashal and colleagues 
(2007) used novel metaphoric, conventional metaphoric, literal and unrelated 
word pairs and asked participants to indicate the nature of relatedness for each 
pair. The authors were able to show stronger activation in the anterior inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG; Brodmann’s areas (BA) 44/45) for novel compared to 
conventional metaphors, as well as activation in frontopolar areas (BA 10) when 
contrasting metaphors and literal phrases with senseless phrases. Although 
these studies can partially contribute to shed light on the neural correlates of 
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creative cognition, there are several factors that limit such generalizations. For 
instance, previous studies either fall short of ensuring the novelty and 
appropriateness of the material used or only control one of these features 
necessary to match the definition of creativity (e.g., Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & 
Kircher, 2004; Stringaris, Medford, Giampietro, Brammer, & David, 2007).This 
criticism does not invalidate the conclusion of the cited studies as in neither case 
the main goal was to investigate creativity per se. Mashal and colleagues (2007), 
however, did claim in their study that findings associated with novel metaphoric 
expressions were relevant for understanding creative operations. Their stimulus 
material, though, was pre-categorized by the experimenter as being novel and 
appropriate. Considering the high inter-individual variability of the organization of 
semantic networks, a semantic connection that might be deemed as creative 
(i.e., both novel and appropriate) by one subject, might not be classified as such 
by another subject. To warrant the conclusions regarding creative thought, it 
would be important to optimize the experimental design in a manner that 
accounts for this inter-individual variability. 
The present study introduces a new paradigm to investigate conceptual 
expansion in creative cognition that is suitable to avoid common problems 
associated with neuroimaging studies of creativity. The study’s aim is to 
investigate singular processes that are involved when engaging in creative 
thinking. The experimental approach adopted in this new paradigm is based on 
the assumption that conceptual expansion can be achieved not only through an 
active cognitive effort to broaden a concept, but can also be induced passively 
through the perception and the resulting integration of two semantically distant 
concepts. The difference between active and passive conceptual expansion 
would be expected to lie in the volitional or self-driven aspect of expanding 
concepts. It cannot be assumed that the cognitive processes involved when 
generating something novel and those involved when understanding something 
novel are exactly the same. However, a substantial overlap between processes 
involved in the active and the passive task can be expected due to the fact that 
the conceptual structures that are being expanded are the very same. Expanding 
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existing concepts would therefore engage similar structures related to semantic 
cognition regardless of the manner in which the expansion was evoked. 
Engaging in active conceptual expansion would likely result in greater activation 
of theses areas and incorporate areas not involved during the passive task, such 
as structures associated with inhibitory control processes or imagery-related 
operations. Nonetheless, because passive conceptual expansion partially draws 
on the same neural structures, it allows one to investigate select aspects of 
creative thinking while avoiding common problems of fMRI investigations of 
creativity. 
Conceptual expansion will be passively induced in the present study by 
having participants read three different types of phrases derived from the 
variation of creativity’s two main features, namely novelty (or unusualness) and 
appropriateness (or relevance). By having subjects process stimuli that are either 
highly unusual and highly appropriate (HUHA: conceptual expansion), highly 
unusual but low appropriate (HULA: unusual/novel), or low unusual but highly 
appropriate (LUHA: common/appropriate), the study aims to take a more specific 
look on the neural correlates of conceptual expansion, novelty and 
appropriateness. Conceptual expansion is held to be achieved through phrases 
represented in the HUHA category given that in this case two formerly unrelated 
or weakly related concepts are directly linked together in an appropriate but novel 
manner for the first time. This requires the boundaries of both concepts to be 
expanded beyond their established limits. By basing the condition-specific 
categorization of the stimuli phrases entirely on participants’ dichotomous ratings 
of the phrases on the response dimensions of unusualness and appropriateness, 
inter-individual differences in the organization of their conceptual networks are 
also accounted for within the experimental design. This approach therefore 
allows for the nonverbal and time-specific investigation of a creative process 
determined on a subject-by-subject basis while, at the same time, providing 
appropriate conditions for comparisons.  
It is hypothesized that conceptual expansion (HUHA) will involve areas in 
the anterior IFG (BA 45 and BA 47) because this area has been linked to 
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semantic retrieval and the resolution of semantic uncertainties (e.g., Badre, 
Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Poldrack et al., 1999; 
Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). Additionally, conceptual 
expansion is expected to lead to activation in the frontopolar region (BA 10) due 
to greater demands on relational information integration for this condition 
compared to the other two. The frontopolar region has been shown to be 
especially involved in the integration of self-generated or inferred information and 
multiple relations (e.g., Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, & Wagner, 2005; Christoff et 
al., 2001; Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, Shamosh, & Dunbar, 2006; Green, 
Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 2010; Kroger et al., 2002). Conceptual 
expansion is also expected to lead to activation in the temporal lobe in the middle 
and inferior temporal gyri (especially, BA 20 and 21), as well as the temporal pole 
(BA 38), areas known to be involved in semantic processing and storage (e.g., 
Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Lambon Ralph, Cipolotti, Manes, & 
Patterson, 2010; Lambon Ralph, Pobric, & Jefferies, 2009; Patterson, Nestor, & 
Rogers, 2007). 
While the investigation of appropriateness will be explorative in the current 
study, novelty processing is also expected to lead to greater demands on 
semantic retrieval and semantic selection which should result in activation in the 
anterior IFG (BA 45 and BA 47) and activation of temporal areas (BA 20, 21 and 
38).  
 
 
3.3 Materials and Methods 
3.3.1 Participants 
 
The original sample included 27 healthy, right-handed students of the University 
of Giessen that participated in the fMRI study in exchange for course credit or 
monetary compensation (€ 17.50). All participants were native German speakers. 
A total of nine participants had to be excluded from data analyses due to 
excessive movement during scanning (n = 2), insufficient number of HUHA 
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judgements (n = 3), and too many wrong answers in the control condition (n = 4), 
thereby possibly defeating the purpose of the control condition, namely to control 
effects of difficulty. All reported analyses and results are based on the final 
sample of 18 participants (9 females). Mean age was 22.78 years (SD = 3.26). 
The experimental standards of the study were approved by the Ethics 
Commission of the German Psychological Society (DGPs). 
 
 
3.3.2 Materials 
  
Fifty-four experimenter-determined stimuli sentence triplets were initially created. 
Each sentence consisted of subject, verb and object in present perfect tense (for 
examples, see Tab. 1). Three different verbs were chosen for each triplet that 
rendered the sentence to be either literal (corresponding to LUHA), senseless 
(corresponding to HULA) or metaphorical (corresponding to HUHA). It is 
important to note that a combination where both unusualness and 
appropriateness are judged as low (LULA) is not possible as the two defining 
characteristics of creativity, unusualness and appropriateness, are not 
independent from each other. Something that is judged to be usual or common is 
by definition appropriate at the same time. Low unusualness or low novelty 
entails that the object, idea or, in this case, combination of semantic instances is 
known or has been encountered before and is therefore immediately appropriate 
as well. An association that is inappropriate or irrelevant would not be 
established in everyday life to also be common or usual. Behavioural pilot studies 
were conducted to arrive at the final set of 132 stimuli used in the fMRI study. 
Inclusion criteria for the metaphorical sentences were determined as follows: 
More than 60% of participants in the pilot study had to judge the phrase as highly 
unusual and highly appropriate. Additionally, at least 60% of participants had to 
agree on the unfamiliarity of the phrase.  
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Table 1: Examples for stimuli phrases 
Example phrases for the three experimental conditions. Critical word is printed in 
bold. 
 
Condition Sentence 
Highly unusual – highly appropriate 
(HUHA) The clouds have danced over the city. 
Highly unusual – low appropriate  
(HULA) The clouds have read over the city. 
Lowly unusual – highly appropriate 
(LUHA) The clouds have moved over the city. 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA showed that the three experimental conditions differed 
significantly (p = .047) from each other in regard of word length of the verb. 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests did reveal, however, that this effect was 
primarily carried by marginally significant differences in verb word length between 
the senseless and the literal verbs (m = 8.45 and m = 9.39, respectively, p = 
.051). Additionally, the verbs were checked for their frequency of occurrence in 
the German language. Using an online tool (http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de/), 
frequency of occurrence for each verb was computed. A median test comparing 
the three conditions showed that the conditions did not differ significantly 
regarding the frequency of occurrence of the verb.  
In order to ensure that possible differences in activation between the 
conditions are not merely an effect of varying reaction times (RTs) associated 
with the answers given to the conditions (as was indicated by the behavioural 
pilot studies) a control condition was included in the experiment. To keep the 
control condition as similar as possible to the experimental conditions and only 
increase difficulty of the task, control sentences consisted of phrases written 
backwards. Participants’ task was to decide whether or not the phrases 
contained an animal and whether or not they contained a spelling error. Another 
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pretest confirmed that the control condition was at least as difficult as the most 
difficult experimental condition as could be seen in reaction times. Forty-four 
control phrases were included in the experiment, containing either an animal and 
a spelling error, an animal and no spelling error, no animal and a spelling error, 
or neither an animal nor a spelling error.  
 
 
3.3.3 Experimental procedure 
 
After giving their written consent to participate in the study and following some 
practice trials outside the scanner, participants completed the experimental task 
during fMRI. Participants were placed on the scanner bed in a supine position. 
Each trial began with a jittered blank screen (0 – 1500 ms), then the presentation 
of a fixation cross for 300 ms, followed by a 200 ms blank screen. Subsequently, 
a stimulus phrase was presented for 3000 ms, followed by the questions 
“Unusual?” and “Appropriate?” for 1500 ms, respectively, separated by a 500 ms 
blank screen. Participants pressed a “yes” or a “no” button on a response box 
with their right index or middle finger, respectively, to indicate their judgements. 
Participants were instructed that they should respond “yes” to the Unusual-
question if the presented information was novel or unfamiliar and “no” if it was 
known or familiar. They were also instructed that they should respond “yes” to 
the Appropriateness-question if the presented information was fitting or relevant 
and “no” if it was unfitting or irrelevant. Following the last question, another 
jittered blank screen was presented (3000 – 4500 ms), resulting in a total trial 
time of 12 s (see Fig. 1). The experiment included 17 null trials consisting in the 
presentation of a blank screen for the length of a regular trial. 
The stimuli phrases were presented in a pseudo-randomized order and 
projected onto a screen at the end of the scanner (visual field = 18°) using an 
LCD projector (EPSON EMP-7250) and were viewed through a mirror mounted 
on the head coil. Upon completion of the scanning session, participants rated 
each stimulus phrase in regard to whether or not they had already known the 
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phrase prior to reading it in the experiment on a 5-point Likert scale2. 
Additionally, participants were asked to complete the vocabulary scale of the 
Hamburg Wechsler Intelligence Test for Adults (HAWIE, Tewes, 1994)3. The 
HAWIE vocabulary scale is assessed by reading 32 words with increasing 
difficulty to the participants and asking them to give a brief definition of each 
word. The resulting number of correctly defined words is transformed into a 
standardized value, while taking the participants’ age into consideration. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Experimental trial Example of the experimental trial timeline. Durations 
are displayed in the bottom line in milliseconds. 
 
                                                 
2 In an initial analysis, only HUHA phrases with a familiarity rating of less than 4 were included for 
each participant. This, however, resulted in a drastic cut in the number of phrases judged as 
unusual and appropriate. When taking into consideration that these types of phrases had been 
selected based on a strict cut-off criterion for familiarity in the behavioural pilot studies, the 
suspicion arose that participants’ familiarity judgments might be biased by the recent encounter of 
the very same phrases in the experiment. To test this assumption, a group of participants that 
had not taken part in any of the pilot studies or the main study (n = 20) filled out the familiarity 
ratings independent from the main study. Results from an independent t-test confirmed the 
existence of a memory bias that was likely to have been caused by the prior presentation of the 
stimuli. Participants that saw the stimuli prior to the familiarity rating evaluated them as more 
familiar than participants that did not see the stimuli prior to the rating (m = 2.60 and m = 2.35, 
respectively; t(86) = -2.31, p = .024). Therefore, the familiarity ratings were dismissed in the 
analyses of the main study due to unreliability. 
3 Analyses that included HAWIE values as a covariate did not lead to differing results and are 
therefore not reported. 
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3.3.4 Data acquisition 
 
Functional and anatomical scans were obtained using a 1.5 Tesla whole-body 
tomography system (Siemens Symphony) with a standard head coil. Structural 
image acquisition consisted of 160 T1-weighted sagittal images (MPRage, 1mm 
slice thickness). A gradient echo field map sequence was acquired before the 
functional image acquisition to obtain information for unwarping B0 distortions. 
For functional imaging, one run with a total of 950 volumes was recorded using a 
T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging sequence (EPI) with 25 slices 
covering the whole brain (slice thickness = 5 mm; gap = 1 mm; descending slice 
order; TA = 100 ms; TE = 55 ms; TR = 2.5 s; flip angle = 90°; field of view = 192 
mm x 192 mm; matrix size = 64 x 64). The orientation of the axial slices was tilted 
to parallel the OFC tissue–bone transition to keep susceptibility artefacts to a 
minimum. 
 
 
3.3.5 Data analysis 
 
For each participant, stimulus phrases were grouped into the three experimental 
conditions based on the participant’s responses. This resulted in a differing 
number of phrases per condition for each subject. To avoid underrepresentation 
of any one experimental condition, subjects with a disproportionate distribution of 
stimulus phrases between the three experimental conditions were excluded from 
data analysis. Cut-off criterion for exclusion of participants was determined at 
less than 28 instances in any one condition. 
Functional data processing and analyses were done using SPM8 package 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; see 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing routines included realignment, 
slice timing, normalization, and smoothing procedures. Each subject’s functional 
images were corrected for motion and unwarped using the first volume as a 
reference, as well as a voxel displacement map (vdm5), constructed using the 
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fieldmap toolbox of SPM8. Realigned and unwarped images were corrected for 
time differences in acquisition. T1 anatomical images were coregistered to the 
mean functional image. Functional images were then normalized with a voxel 
size of 3 mm to the anatomical image and spatially smoothed using a 9 mm full-
width, half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian filter.  
First and second level analyses were computed using a general linear 
model approach (Friston et al., 1994). For each subject, three experimental 
conditions, the control condition and the null trials were modelled as regressors 
and convolved with the standard hemodynamic response function combined with 
time and dispersion derivatives. Regressor onsets were equal to stimulus onsets 
and were modelled in an epoch-related design with an epoch duration of 7 s 
(from the stimulus phrase onset till the end of presentation time for the second 
question). Additionally, the six movement parameters obtained by the 
realignment procedure were included into the model to account for possible 
residual movement artefacts after realignment and a high-pass filter of 1/150s 
was employed. One-sample t-tests were computed to obtain the relevant contrast 
images for each single subject. The contrast images were entered into group 
statistics analyses.  
Conjunction analyses were carried out to uncover which brain regions are 
commonly activated across contrasts as a function of a particular process of 
interest. Conjunction analyses allow for the investigation of activation that is 
conjointly present in two contrasts. Contrasts of interest obtained on first level 
were entered into paired t-tests on second level using the conjunction null 
hypothesis (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005). Tests using the 
conjunction null hypothesis are more conservative in that they test for an AND 
conjunction that only dismisses the null hypothesis if all subjects show activation 
in the tested voxel in both contrasts. Using conjunction analyses allows for the 
investigation of activation that is specific to conceptual expansion separated as 
opposed to activations caused solely by novelty or appropriateness. In order to 
investigate activity related to the novelty of the stimulus phrase, a conjunction 
analysis of the contrasts that compared the two highly unusual conditions to the 
 53 
low unusual condition, respectively, (Novelty = HUHA > LUHA ∩ HULA > LUHA) 
was computed. For activity specific to the appropriateness dimension of the 
stimulus phrases, we looked at the conjunction of contrasts comparing the two 
highly appropriate conditions with the low appropriate condition, respectively 
(Appropriateness = HUHA > HULA ∩ LUHA > HULA). Finally, specific activation 
caused by conceptual expansion was assessed through a conjunction analysis 
involving the contrasts between the highly unusual and highly appropriate 
phrases and the remaining two experimental conditions, respectively (conceptual 
expansion = HUHA > HULA ∩ HUHA > LUHA).  
Based on the a priori expectations, five Regions-of–Interest (ROI) were 
designed using the WFU Pick Atlas toolbox available for SPM8 (Maldjian, 
Laurienti, & Burdette, 2004; Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003). ROIs 
were created for Brodmann’s areas 10, 45, 47, 21, 22 and 384. Unless specified 
otherwise, all reported data have been FWE – corrected for multiple comparisons 
at p < .05. As the cognitive effects under investigation in the present study are 
complex, clusters consisting of three or more voxels (minimum cluster size: 81 
                                                 
4 We also conducted whole-brain voxel-wise analyses. Alongside other areas of activation, the 
whole-brain analyses revealed greater activation in bilateral IFG (BA 45 and BA 47) and left MTG 
(BA 22) for conceptual expansion, in bilateral SFG and MFG (BA 10/11) and left MTG (BA 21) for 
appropriateness, as well as in right IFG (BA 45) for novelty. Due to a priori hypotheses about the 
involvement of these areas and overlapping findings for whole-brain and ROI analyses, only the 
ROI results are reported. Tables with whole-brain results and a color-coded map depicting 
overlap between conceptual expansion and novelty in the prefrontal cortex can be found in the 
supplementary material.  
Additional contrasts were computed using the control condition as an inclusive mask. Given that 
masking the contrasts did not change the results and the fact that RTs as an indicator of task 
difficulty did not differ significantly between experimental conditions, all analyses reported in the 
paper disregard the control condition. Results of the direct contrast between the HUHA condition 
compared to the control condition are included in the supplementary material. 
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cubic mm) are reported in order to reduce the risk of type II errors (Lieberman & 
Cunningham, 2009). 
 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Behavioral data 
 
Table 2 shows means and standard deviations for the four conditions for each 
question. A repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with factors condition (HUHA, 
HULA, LUHA, control) and question type (unusual, appropriate) was conducted 
to determine possible differences in RTs. The analysis showed significant main 
effects of condition (F(3, 51) = 3,47, p = .023) and question type (F(1, 17) = 
137,47, p < .001), as well as a significant interaction between condition and 
question type (F(3, 51) = 15.01, p < .001). Further analyses showed that RTs for 
the “unusual/animal” question were slower than for the “appropriate/error” 
question (m = 718.1 ms and m = 567.9 ms for unusual/animal and 
appropriate/error, respectively; p = <.001). Reaction times were also significantly 
longer for the control condition compared to every experimental condition for the 
“unusual/animal” question only (p = .038, p = .01, and p = .001 for control vs. 
HUHA, HULA, and LUHA, respectively; see Table 2 for corresponding means). 
For the “appropriate/error” question, HUHA showed a slightly longer RT 
compared to the control condition (p = .025). As no behavioural differences were 
found between the three experimental conditions, the control condition will not be 
discussed further. 
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Table 2: Reaction times 
Mean reaction times in milliseconds for the four conditions for each question. 
Standard deviations are given in brackets. 
 
Condition                              Question 
 Unusual Appropriate 
HUHA 701.6 (208.3) 605.0 (200.3) 
HULA 692.1 (172.6) 593.3 (140.8) 
LUHA 677.8 (175.7) 539.3 (151.0) 
Control 801.0 (115.3) 533.9 (151.1) 
 
 
3.4.2 Neuroimaging data 
 
Table 3 shows the regions of significant activation for all three conjunction 
analyses in the ROIs BA 10, 20, 21, 38, 45 and 47. For the conjunction analysis 
aimed at revealing activation associated with conceptual expansion (HUHA > 
HULA ∩ HUHA > LUHA) it was hypothesized that there would be significant 
activation in the anterior IFG (BA 45 and 47), the middle temporal gyrus (BA 20 
and 21), as well as the frontopolar cortex (BA 10). The findings partially confirm 
the hypotheses as a significant increase in BOLD signal was found in the left IFG 
(BA 45 and BA 47) for HUHA compared to HULA and LUHA: Additionally, there 
was significant activation in the right IFG (BA 45) and the left temporal pole (BA 
38). Activations were also found in the left middle frontal and superior frontal gyri 
corresponding to the frontopolar cortex (BA 10), albeit only uncorrected at a 
threshold of p < .001.  
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Table 3: Overview of brain activations 
Activation peaks for the different conjunction analyses. Peak coordinates of each 
cluster are given in standard MNI space. Structure, Brodmann’s area (BA), 
Hemisphere (Hem), cluster size and peak t-value (t) are presented, as well. 
Significance threshold for the analyses is p < .05 (FWE-corrected) and extent 
threshold is k ≥ 3 (minimum cluster size: 81 cubic mm). Asterisk marks 
significance threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected). ROIs: bilateral Brodmann’s 
areas 10, 20, 21, 45, 47 and 38; IFG: Inferior frontal gyrus; MFG: Middle frontal 
gyrus; MTG: Middle temporal gyrus; STG: Superior temporal gyrus. 
    MNI peak coordinate  
Area BA Hem Cluster size     x             y            z t 
Conceptual expansion (HUHA > HULA ∩ HUHA > LUHA) 
IFG 45 L 16 -48 17 4 5.12 
IFG 45 R 5 60 17 4 4.80 
IFG 47 L 9 -42 20 1 5.05 
IFG/MFG 47/11 L 44 -36 29 -8 8.14 
MFG 10 L 3 -33 50 13 4.67* 
MFG 10 L 4 -30 53 19 3.77* 
STG 38 L 5 -48 20 -14 4.91 
Appropriateness (HUHA > HULA ∩ LUHA > HULA) 
MTG 21 L 6 -63 -22 -14 6.22 
Novelty (HUHA > LUHA ∩ HULA > LUHA) 
IFG 45 R 4 54 29 7 3.94* 
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 It was expected that the processing of novel or unusual information would 
lead to activations in the anterior IFG (BA 45 and 47) as well as the middle 
temporal gyrus and temporal pole (BA 20, 21 and 38). These hypotheses were 
only partially confirmed as the conjunction analysis which assessed activations 
associated with novelty processing (HUHA > LUHA ∩ HULA > LUHA) only 
showed activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45), also at an 
uncorrected threshold of p < .001.  
 Finally, an explorative conjunction analysis was carried out to uncover 
which brain areas are associated with the processing of appropriateness (HUHA 
> HULA ∩ LUHA > HULA). The findings revealed the significant involvement of 
the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Activations as a function of conceptual expansion Conceptual 
expansion: Activations as a function of conceptual expansion in the Regions-of-
Interest (a) Left mid-inferior frontal gyrus (IFG: BA 45), (b) Left anterior IFG (BA 
47) and (c) Left frontopolar cortex (BA10). Color bars represent Z-value at an 
FWE-corrected p < .05 for BA 45 and BA 47, at an uncorrected p < .001 for BA 
10. 
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3.5 Discussion 
 
This study employs a new approach to investigate creative cognition by breaking 
down the concept of creativity into single processes and focusing on one 
cognitive operation playing a central role in creative cognition, namely conceptual 
expansion. Here, passively inducing conceptual expansion in participants and 
letting them determine the nature of the respective stimulus phrase rendered it 
possible to obtain a clearer picture on the brain activations that are associated 
with conceptual expansion, novelty and appropriateness. 
 
 
3.5.1 Conceptual expansion 
 
The results confirm the hypotheses concerning the aspects of information 
processing involved in conceptual expansion. As expected, we were able to 
show bilateral anterior IFG (BA 45/47) involvement in the processing of 
conceptual expansion. The findings reveal several clusters especially within the 
left lateral anterior IFG for phrases judged as unusual and appropriate (HUHA). 
Activations in these areas, albeit to a smaller extent, were also found in 
analogous regions in the right hemisphere. Recent studies have linked this 
region to an increased effort to retrieve semantic information and greater 
semantic selection demands (Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 
1997; Wagner, Pare-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001; Wig, Miller, Kingstone, & 
Kelley, 2004) as well as increasing semantic distance (Green, Kraemer, 
Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 2010). In the present study, these regions were 
more strongly recruited during conceptual expansion, i.e. when a phrase was 
judged by the participant as being both novel and appropriate in a given context. 
Deciding on the novelty and appropriateness of the phrases seems to call for an 
increased demand on controlled retrieval and selection of semantic knowledge 
that is not as necessary when faced with stimuli that are only novel (HULA) or 
only appropriate (LUHA). Unusual and appropriate phrases require the recovery 
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of semantic knowledge about the two semantically distant concepts that need to 
be brought into relation.  
While the role of the IFG appears indisputable in semantic processing, 
there is some debate as to the precise role of this region. Wagner and colleagues 
(2001), for instance, have claimed that the left anterior IFG is associated with 
controlled retrieval of semantic knowledge, whereas Thompson-Schill and 
colleagues (1997) argue for the role of the left anterior IFG in semantic selection 
rather than retrieval processes. A more recent account by Badre and colleagues 
(2005) incorporates both possible functions of the anterior IFG, such that the left 
anterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47) is held to be more strongly 
recruited when a task necessitates top-down retrieval of semantic knowledge, 
whereas the left mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 45) is more strongly 
associated with the mediation of semantic selection. Both of these postulations 
can be applied to the current results as phrases judged to be both unusual and 
appropriate require the controlled retrieval of concepts and their distinct features, 
as well as the selection of an appropriate manner in which the concepts can be 
linked with each other.  
In line with several previous studies that have identified the left middle 
temporal cortex (BA 21/22) and the temporal poles as areas linked with semantic 
knowledge (Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Bokde, 
Tagamets, Friedman, & Horwitz, 2001; Lambon Ralph, Cipolotti, Manes, & 
Patterson, 2010), the present study also found activations along the left temporal 
pole as a function of conceptual expansion. In an attempt to bring together these 
two facets of semantic processing, Badre and colleagues (2005) proposed a two-
step model of semantic memory in which semantic knowledge is stored within the 
temporal cortex. Retrieval of information from temporal regions emerges via 
automatic or controlled processes (Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & 
Wagner, 2005). Semantic selection processes as subserved by the mid-
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex run parallel in both cases whereas controlled 
retrieval is held to be mediated by the left anterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. 
Results of the present study fit well within this model as both IFG (BA 45/47) as 
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well as temporal pole (BA 38) activations resulted as a function of conceptual 
expansion (HUHA) implicating semantic selection, controlled semantic retrieval 
and semantic storage related processes. Automatic semantic retrieval is unlikely 
to have resulted within HUHA trials due to the uncommonness of the phrase.  
The hypothesis concerning greater frontopolar activation (BA 10) when 
processing conceptual expansion could also be confirmed, albeit only at an 
uncorrected threshold of p < .001. This region has been implicated as playing a 
role in integrating the output of multiple cognitive operations (Ramnani & Owen, 
2004) which was required in the present study due to the processing demands of 
the HUHA stimuli. Conceptual expansion was expected to result in greater 
relational information integration efforts in the frontopolar region as the 
connection of two previously unrelated or weakly related concepts in a novel and 
appropriate way necessitates the recovery of knowledge about the two distant 
concepts that need to be brought into relation to one another. Previous studies 
have shown the recruitment of frontopolar areas when processing highly complex 
stimuli in a reasoning task (Kroger et al., 2002), as well as when integrating 
relations across semantic distance in an analogy task (Green, Kraemer, 
Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 2010). Some studies have extended the role of the 
left frontopolar region even further by proposing that relational integration is 
achieved through the manipulation of self-inferred or self-generated information 
(Christoff et al., 2001; Christoff, Ream, Geddes, & Gabrieli, 2003). Notably, the 
involvement of this region as a function of conceptual expansion using the 
present paradigm could be also seen as an indicator for the suitability of an 
indirect approach to investigate conceptual expansion. After all, even though 
participants in the present study did not have to actively or volitionally expand 
concepts and thereby self-generate the information, the decision as to whether or 
not a phrase was unusual and appropriate had to be self-inferred by the 
participants.  
In sum, the passive expansion of existing concepts seems to be 
associated with a network of processes associated with different structures in 
frontal and temporal areas.  
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3.5.2 Novelty 
 
In the case of activity caused by the novelty of the phrases, the obtained results 
partially deviate from what was predicted. Both categories of unusual phrases 
were expected to elicit activation in the anterior IFG (BA 45/47) due to greater 
semantic retrieval and selection demands. The results revealed only a small area 
of IFG activation (BA 45) in the right hemisphere, albeit only at an uncorrected 
threshold of p < .001. One possible explanation for this finding might lie in the 
nature of the unusual and inappropriate phrases. HULA phrases might have 
been easily dismissed as senseless. This view is shared by Mashal and 
colleagues (2009) in their interpretation of the lack of activation for nonsensical 
sentences compared to literal or metaphorical ones. This would imply that the 
phrases judged as unusual and senseless by the participants were easily 
disregarded as such and did not recruit increased retrieval effort to reach a 
conclusion and to find a link between the two concepts implied through the 
stimulus. This obvious senselessness seems to, in turn, deem semantic retrieval 
under the control of the anterior IFG (BA 47) unnecessary. Here, our findings 
deviate from those of Stringaris and colleagues (2007) who showed anterior IFG 
activation not only for metaphoric but also for non-meaningful sentences 
compared to literal ones. However, these differences in the pattern of findings 
may be due to the different nature of the stimulus phrases used in both studies. 
While Stringaris and colleagues (2007) presented participants with phrases in the 
form of “Some X are Y”, our stimulus material was not as abstract and therefore 
closer to everyday language in content and in structure. This might have made it 
easier to dismiss senseless phrases as such in our study.  
The obvious senselessness of the HULA phrases can also account for the 
lack of expected activation in the MTG and temporal pole regions (BA 20, 21 and 
38) in relation to novelty processing. The senselessness of HULA stimuli might 
have been too obvious to initiate an extensive search in and retrieval from 
semantic networks in the temporal lobe. These are only post-hoc theoretical 
postulations. Yet, this is a previously unconsidered yet fascinating issue in the 
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domain of semantic novelty processing that requires further research in order to 
comprehend its precise ramifications. 
 
 
3.5.3 Appropriateness 
 
Due to the explorative nature of the investigation into the neural processing of the 
appropriateness of the phrases, there were no predictions made in advance. The 
results nevertheless hold surprising findings that seem counterintuitive at first. 
Appropriateness in the present study led to activation in the left middle temporal 
gyrus (BA 21). Initially, greater activation in this area was expected for 
conceptual expansion as well as for the novelty aspect of the phrases due to 
greater efforts to retrieve semantic knowledge. For conceptual expansion, these 
expectations were met, whereas this was not the case for novelty, most likely 
due to the nature of the HULA phrases. Finding activation in the middle temporal 
gyrus as a function of appropriateness therefore appears counterintuitive at first. 
This result can, however, be explained with Badre and colleagues’ (2005) 
proposal on semantic memory retrieval with the temporal areas functioning as 
knowledge storage that can be drawn upon through automatic or IFG-controlled 
processes. For phrases rated as LUHA, it can assumed that the retrieval of 
information about the commonness and appropriateness of the phrases happens 
through a more shallow processing without the need to elaborate deeper on 
semantic knowledge due to their literal nature. Common and appropriate phrases 
occur in everyday language and are therefore likely to be processed highly 
automatically, whereas the nature of phrases judged to be unusual and 
appropriate (HUHA) requires prefrontal executive control to retrieve the relevant 
semantic knowledge. 
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3.5.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
Even though the results of the present study contribute to the investigation of 
creative thinking, there are some limitations that have to be kept in mind when 
interpreting the findings. One of the fortes of the present study is the fact that 
creativity is not treated as a single entity but rather as a construct involving 
different cognitive processes. The present study focused on conceptual 
expansion as one of theses processes involved in creative thinking. However, 
this approach also brings forth certain limitations to the interpretation of the 
results. Findings from the present study are related to conceptual expansion as 
one cognitive operation relevant to creativity, but cannot claim to reflect activation 
caused by creativity in general. Interpretations of the findings are limited to the 
process of passively induced conceptual expansion in a verbal task which, 
nevertheless, plays an important role in creative thought. It must be noted, 
however, that studies using non-verbal semantic cognition tasks have implicated 
some of the same regions found in our research (e.g., Lambon Ralph et al., 
2010; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) hinting at the possible involvement of these 
regions in nonverbal creative tasks, as well. Additionally, the areas found to be 
associated with conceptual expansion are not exclusive to creative thinking but 
rather are involved in other cognitive operations, as well. This fact, however, is in 
line with the creative cognition approach which postulates fundamental cognitive 
processes that are shared by all humans as forming the core of operations that 
enable creative thinking (Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). 
Another limitation of the study stems from the application of a conceptual 
expansion task that involves semantic relations. The resulting involvement of the 
IFG and related regions is not surprising when considering that the conceptual 
expansion task used in the present study is of semantic content. The current 
findings regarding the IFG are therefore only applicable to creative operations 
involving semantic relations. Whether or not the IFG would also be activated 
during creativity tasks that primarily involve other operations such as creative 
imagery remains an open question.  
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 The most significant limitation of the present study is that creative thinking 
was not explicitly assessed within the experimental design. Previous functional 
neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies on creativity have required that 
subjects attempt to generate original responses while their brain responses are 
being recorded. The approach adopted in the current study was very different in 
that (1) only one specific aspect of creative cognition, namely conceptual 
expansion, was targeted, and (2) conceptual expansion was passively induced 
(as opposed to actively generated) during the experiment. This raises the critical 
question of how well the insights gained from the present study can be integrated 
with the literature on the neurocognition of creativity when the self-generation of 
creative ideas was not assessed. When considering this question, it is important 
to keep two critical issues in mind. 
 First, one of the endemic problems of creativity research is that creative 
thinking is an inherently unpredictable phenomenon (Dietrich & Kanso, 2011). 
Despite our best efforts, it is not possible to reliably or predictably prompt 
creativity within an experimental setting. Previous functional neuroimaging 
studies on creative thinking have not been immune to this problem because, 
even if they have assessed the brain's response when participants carry out 
creative tasks in an fMRI or PET scanner, "trying to be creative" is certainly not 
equivalent to "being creative". Moreover, it is not possible to guarantee the 
“creativeness” of the response as participants are likely to also generate 
uncreative responses despite being told to be creative, and vice versa. These are 
the limitations of investigating the creative process, as it is, almost by definition, a 
singular event that is extremely difficult to study in laboratory conditions. 
Additionally, studying creative thinking within functional neuroimaging settings 
inherently involves severe methodological problems, such as those that have 
been outlined in the Introduction that are extremely difficult to overcome in an 
optimal manner. The field of creativity research has therefore used proxy 
procedures and measures in order to unravel this fascinating ability and the 
present study is one such attempt to do so. Even though these proxy procedures 
to investigate creativity remain imperfect solutions, they can still contribute to 
 65 
enhancing our knowledge of the information processing mechanisms involved in 
creative thinking.  
 Secondly, the approach adopted in this study was motivated in part by 
recent calls in the field for the need to approach the neurocognitive study of 
creativity in a systematic and creative manner as a necessary next step (Dietrich, 
2007). One of the more obvious paths that can be adopted in order to 
systematically investigate creativity is to assess its component cognitive 
operations. While the experimental design of the present study is admittedly 
unconventional, it was tailored to assess conceptual expansion, which is a core 
facet of creative thinking. We believe that such attempts (also see Kröger et al., 
in press) will enable us to get closer to the overarching goal of the field which is 
to understand the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying creative thinking. 
 
 
3.5.5 Implications for laterality of language processing 
 
Though not specifically planned as a study on the laterality of language 
processing, the results of the present study can contribute to this discussion. 
According to the graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1999) and Jung-Beeman’s 
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Jung-Beeman, 2005) coarse semantic coding theory, 
novel metaphoric expressions are primarily processed in areas in the right 
hemisphere, either due to their non-salience (Giora, 1999) or due to a more 
coarse semantic network that allows for large semantic fields and in turn includes 
more distant concepts (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Jung-Beeman, 2005). The 
results of our study do not confirm these right hemispheric processing theories. 
For phrases eliciting conceptual expansion which were non-salient and recruit 
the activation of semantically distant concepts, we found activations that were 
more strongly lateralized to the left hemisphere. Such findings also go against 
the generic idea of a stronger involvement of the right hemisphere during creative 
processes (Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010).  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
In sum, the present study took a step towards untangling the complex concept of 
creativity. By using a new experimental approach, we were able to show the 
involvement of frontal and temporal regions known to be associated with 
semantic cognition and relational reasoning in the processing of novel 
metaphoric phrases thought to elicit passive conceptual expansion. This was 
done by assessing the stimuli based on the fundamental features of creativity, 
i.e., novelty and appropriateness. Our results especially stress the importance of 
the anterior IFG (BA 45/47), the temporal pole (BA 38) and, to a lesser extent, 
the lateral frontopolar cortex (BA 10) for conceptual expansion. These regions 
are known to be involved in semantic selection (IFG: BA 45), controlled semantic 
retrieval (IFG: BA 47), semantic knowledge storage (temporal poles: BA 38) and 
relational information integration (frontopolar cortex: BA 10). While the MTG was 
associated with the factor of appropriateness, only the mid-IFG (BA 45) was 
associated with the factor of novelty in that it was activated during the processing 
of novel metaphorical and nonsensical phrases. Even though certain areas of 
activation can be found for either conceptual expansion, novelty and 
appropriateness, the fact that the common activation of IFG, frontopolar cortex 
and temporal pole can only be found in the conceptual expansion conjunction 
points to the significance of these regions during creative thinking over and 
above novelty and appropriateness processing. Inducing conceptual expansion 
through indirect or passive means offers new possibilities that might expedite the 
research on creative cognition to great heights. 
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3.8 Supplementary Material 
 
Table S1 Overview of activations found in whole-brain analyses 
Whole-brain activation peaks for the three conjunction analyses. Peak 
coordinates are given in standard MNI space. Structure, Brodmann’s area (BA), 
Hemisphere (Hem), cluster size and peak t-value (t) are presented, as well. 
Significance threshold for the analyses is p < .001 (uncorrected), extent threshold 
is k ≥ 10. IFG: Inferior frontal gyrus; IPL: Inferior parietal lobule; MFG: Middle 
frontal gyrus; SFG: Superior frontal gyrus; ACC: Anterior cingulate cortex; MTG: 
Middle temporal gyrus. 
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    MNI peak coordinate  
Area BA Hem Cluster size     x           y          z t 
Conceptual expansion (HUHA > HULA ∩ HUHA > LUHA) 
IFG 45 R 10 60 17 4 3.77 
IFG/MFG 45/47 R 73 54 35 13 5.69 
IFG/MFG 46/47 L 746 -36 29 -8 8.14 
IFG 47 R 14 36 32 -11 4.36 
SFG 8/9 L/R 312 -6 26 58 6.13 
MFG/cingulate gyrus 8/32 L 45 -27 8 37 5.43 
MTG 22 L 32 -57 -52 1 3.94 
Thalamus   257 0 -16 7 7.11 
Cerebellum  R 221 30 -73 -41 7.50 
Cerebellum   17 0 -43 4 3.66 
Appropriateness (HUHA > HULA ∩ LUHA > HULA) 
MFG 10 L 44 -21 59 10 5.69 
SFG/MFG 10/11 L 101 -33 47 -14 6.15 
SFG/MFG 11 L/R 68 3 50 -17 4.82 
SFG 8/9 L 135 -15 47 40 6.59 
ACC/Caudate 24/32 L 77 -9 14 -2 4.63 
Caudate  R 70 9 17 -2 4.69 
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    MNI peak coordinate  
Area BA Hem Cluster size     x           y          z t 
MTG 21 L 43 -63 -22 -14 6.22 
IPL/angular gyrus 39/40 L 392 -51 -58 49 7.25 
Cerebellum  L 105 -42 -70 -38 4.30 
Cerebellum  R 43 42 -76 -44 5.60 
Novelty (HUHA > LUHA ∩ HULA > LUHA) 
IFG 45 R 11 51 29 7 3.44 
SFG 6 L 42 -6 11 64 4.70 
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Table S2 Overview of activations found for HUHA > control  
Activation peaks for bilateral Region-of-Interests BA 10, BA 20, BA 21, BA 45, 
BA 47 and BA 38. Peak coordinates of each cluster are given in standard MNI 
space. Structure, Brodmann’s area (BA), Hemisphere (Hem), cluster size and 
peak t-value (t) are presented, as well. Significance threshold for the analyses is 
p < .05 (FWE-corrected); extent threshold k ≥ 3. IFG: Inferior frontal gyrus; MFG: 
Middle frontal gyrus; SFG: Superior frontal gyrus; STG: Superior temporal gyrus. 
 
    MNI peak coordinate  
Area BA Hem Cluster size     x          y           z t 
HUHA > control 
IFG 45 L 6 -48 26 1 5.68 
IFG 47 L 48 -42 29 -11 8.57 
IFG 47 L 4 -48 35 -5 6.11 
SFG 10 L 11 -18 56 28 7.56 
MFG 10 L 32 -6 62 22 6.86 
STG 38 L 6 -48 20 -14 5.42 
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Figure S1 Overlapping activation for Conceptual expansion and Novelty 
Commonly activated areas across two conjunctions (conceptual expansion and 
novelty) for whole-brain voxel-wise analysis at p < .001 (uncorrected). Red: 
Conceptual expansion; blue: Novelty; purple: overlapping area of activation. x = 
54. 
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4 Study 2 
Can clouds dance? Part 2: An ERP investigation of 
passive conceptual expansion5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Publication: Rutter, B., Kröger, S., Hill, H., Windmann, S., Hermann, C., & Abraham, A. (2012). 
Brain and Cognition, 80, 301-310.  
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4.1 Abstract 
 
Conceptual expansion, one of the core operations in creative cognition, was 
investigated in the present ERP study. An experimental paradigm using novel 
metaphoric, nonsensical and literal phrases was employed where individual 
differences in conceptual knowledge organization were accounted for by using 
participants’ responses to categorize the stimuli to each condition. The 
categorization was determined by their judgment of the stimuli on the two 
defining criteria of creativity: unusualness and appropriateness. Phrases judged 
as unusual and appropriate were of special interest as they are novel and 
unfamiliar phrases thought to passively induce conceptual expansion. The results 
showed a graded N400 modulation for phrases judged to be unusual and 
inappropriate (nonsense) or unusual and appropriate (conceptual expansion, 
novel metaphorical) relative to usual and appropriate (literal) phrases. The N400 
is interpreted as indexing greater effort to retrieve semantic information and 
integrate the novel concepts presented through the phrases. Analyses of the 
later time-window showed an ongoing negativity that was graded in the same 
manner as the N400. The findings attest to the usefulness of investigating 
creative cognition using event-related electrophysiology. 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
Creativity constitutes a fascinating ability in the repertoire of human adaptive 
behavior. Among the different theoretical frameworks concerning the definition of 
creativity and its underlying cognitive structures (e.g., Abraham & Windmann, 
2007; Boden, 2003; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Mednick, 1962; Ward, 1994; 
Ward, 2007; Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999), a working definition has resulted about 
what makes an idea or product creative. According to this definition, a creative 
thought or product is one that is both original and appropriate to the task at hand 
(e.g., Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). 
 
 
4.2.1 Creativity as a complex of multiple cognitive processes 
 
Despite the consensus-based definition of what creativity entails, neuroscientific 
research is far from drawing a coherent picture of creative processes with 
reference to brain functions. This is due to various problems, including 
methodological limitations, such as drawing or vocal responses and lengthy trial 
durations that render standard creativity tasks suboptimal when combined with 
neuroscientific techniques.  
 One of the main conceptual problems, however, is the fact that creativity is 
rarely investigated in terms of the multitude of single cognitive operations that 
underlie creativity (Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). This is based in part 
on a widely held misconception of creativity with regard to the type of thinking 
that is believed to lead to a creative outcome. Divergent thinking which is evoked 
when multiple solutions can be generated to solve a problem, is often thought to 
be the only type of thinking to produce creativity. However, convergent thinking, 
which is evoked, when a problem has only one correct solution, can also 
contribute to creative thinking. Convergent processes in creativity are commonly 
targeted in the field of insight problem solving (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & 
Kounios, 2005). Conversely, divergent thinking can also occur during tasks that 
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do not call for a creative solution, such as hypothetical or prospective reasoning 
(e.g., Abraham,  Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2008) where the number of potential 
solutions is open ended. In studying creative cognition, we move beyond this 
classification of convergent versus divergent thinking and instead focus on the 
cognitive operations involved in creative thinking (e.g., Finke, Ward & Smith, 
1992). Just as in the case of other cognitive processes like working memory or 
semantic retrieval, creative operations like creative imagery or conceptual 
expansion could occur under conditions of divergent or convergent thought. 
 One cognitive process that is of particular interest in the investigation of 
creativity is “conceptual expansion”. As the term suggests, conceptual expansion 
describes the ability to broaden one’s existing concepts beyond their 
conventional limits to include new features or exemplars (Ward, 1994; Ward, 
Smith & Vaid, 1997) and requires divergent thinking. Widening one’s concepts, 
especially over greater associative distances, is the basis for arriving at novel 
and applicable solutions for a problem at hand, thereby fulfilling the two 
requirements that render an outcome to be creative. In the framework of the 
creative cognition approach which postulates that creative thinking arises from 
ordinary fundamental cognitive processes present in all humans, conceptual 
expansion is discussed as being among the core cognitive operations that are 
recruited when arriving at a creative solution (Ward, 1994). The original task that 
assessed conceptual expansion as a creative process asked participants to draw 
animals from a planet that is different from earth (Ward, 1994; Ward, Patterson, 
Sifonis, Dodds, & Saunders, 2002). Participants’ ability to expand existing 
concepts is measured by the degree to which the drawn animals deviate from 
earth creatures in terms of their basic features. While the original task assessing 
conceptual expansion cannot be suitably adapted to assess conceptual 
expansion in neuroscientific settings, the vital role played by conceptual 
expansion in creative cognition indicates that it is imperative to develop 
alternative paradigms that allow for a better understanding of the 
neurophysiological mechanisms underlying this creative cognitive operation. 
 
 84 
4.2.2 Creativity and electrophysiological measures 
 
While several studies have investigated creativity using electroencephalograms 
(EEG), as yet no study has attempted to link any component related to event-
related potentials (ERP) with creative thinking (for a thorough review, see 
Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). One exception to this claim are studies on the 
phenomenon of insight during problem solving (e.g., Lang et al., 2006; Lavric, 
Forstmeier, & Rippon, 2000; Qiu et al., 2008). This is unfortunate given that 
ERPs offer significant advantages when investigating cognitive operations 
compared to other neurophysiological methods such as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Apart from a high temporal resolution, specific ERP 
components are held to represent distinct cognitive processes so this method 
allows for the determination of the onset and temporal distribution of the cognitive 
process of interest.  
 The N400 ERP component, for instance, is certainly of great relevance 
with regard to processes involved during conceptual expansion. The N400 is a 
negative-going waveform with a centro-parietal distribution, typically appearing 
around 300 ms to 600 ms after onset of its activating event and peaking around 
400 ms after stimulus onset. Modulation of the N400 amplitude has been 
reported for various factors, including semantically incongruous words (Kutas & 
Hillyard, 1980a; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980b), cloze probability of the final word 
(Kutas & Hillyard, 1984), words violating the preceding discourse context or world 
knowledge (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Hald, Steenbeek-
Planting, & Hagoort, 2007; van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999) and the 
difficulty of semantic integration (e.g., Kutas & Van Petten, 1994). The N400 is 
considered to be an index of the difficulty to retrieve conceptual knowledge from 
the memory stores in the brain (e.g., Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Kutas, Van 
Petten, & Kluender, 2006). In semantic priming studies, the N400 has also been 
interpreted as an index for higher-level integrational processes (e.g., Brown & 
Hagoort, 1993).  
 As conceptual expansion requires the search for existing concepts and the 
integration of new semantic associations with these existing concepts, the N400 
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constitutes the candidate ERP component to indicate the occurrence of those 
cognitive operations. Moreover, results from fMRI studies investigating creative 
thinking have demonstrated that the brain structures that are known to be 
involved in semantic selection, retrieval and integration (e.g., Badre, Poldrack, 
Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, Shamosh, & 
Dunbar, 2006; Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 2010Poldrack et al., 
1999; Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farrah, 1997) are engaged during 
creative conceptual expansion, as well (Kröger et al., 2012; Rutter et al., 2012). It 
remains unclear, however, if such parallels can be transferred to ERPs in a 
similar manner. The present study is the first of its kind to investigate creative 
cognition using ERPs. The objective is to clarify the manner in which ERP 
components that index semantic cognitive operations are modulated by creative 
cognitive processes. 
 
 
4.2.3 The present study 
 
Conceptual expansion is investigated in the present ERP study with the 
concurrent aim of overcoming some of the aforementioned shortcomings in 
neurophysiological research on creativity. A new approach is adopted which is 
based on the assumption that conceptual expansion cannot only be brought 
about “actively” such as when one volitionally attempts to expand a concept to 
include novel and relevant facets relating to other concepts, but also “passively” 
through the presentation of two distantly associated items that need to be 
connected through the widening of concepts (Kröger et al., 2012; Rutter et al., 
2012). The approach adopted in the current study takes the latter perspective. 
Participants are not provided with a task that actively requires them to engage in 
conceptual expansion. Instead, conceptual expansion is passively induced in 
participants. A suitable way to implement this approach is to draw from 
experimental paradigms used in metaphor processing studies.  
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 The comprehension of novel metaphors heavily relies on the integration of 
two distant concepts to provide meaning. Psycholinguistic studies on novel 
metaphor processing have repeatedly shown an increased N400 amplitude for 
novel metaphors compared to conventional metaphors and literal expressions 
(e.g., Arzouan, Goldstein, & Faust, 2007; De Grauwe, Swain, Holcomb, Ditman, 
& Kuperberg, 2010; Lai, Curran, & Menn, 2009). While the main focus of 
metaphor studies is to investigate how language is processed under different 
syntactic or semantic constraints, the objective of the current study is to 
differentiate how the information processing involved during conceptual 
expansion differs from the processing of mere unusualness and appropriateness. 
Although the current study differs from investigations of metaphor processing in 
terms of the main goals, paradigms from the language comprehension field have 
been adapted in the current study to suit our ends.  
 Participants in the current study were presented with novel metaphoric, 
nonsensical and literal expressions. In order to account for individual differences 
in participants’ conceptual knowledge structures and their abilities to expand 
existing concepts, the new paradigm does not rely on classic experimenter-
determined experimental conditions. Instead, the current approach requires 
participants to make yes/no judgments on the presented phrases with regard to 
the originality (unusualness) and relevance (appropriateness). Originality and 
relevance, as mentioned earlier, are the two defining features of creativity. This 
procedure results in the subject-determined categorization of the stimuli phrases 
as belonging to one of the following conditions: highly unusual and highly 
appropriate (HUHA/novel metaphoric), highly unusual and low appropriate 
(HULA/nonsense) or low unusual and highly appropriate (LUHA/literal). 
Examples for each of the conditions can be found in Table 1. Phrases from the 
HUHA category are those that induce conceptual expansion in participants as it 
contains instances where previously unrelated or weakly related concepts are 
associated with one another in a novel yet relevant manner. It has to be noted 
that a combination of low unusualness and low appropriateness is not possible, 
as an association which is low in appropriateness is automatically highly unusual.  
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 Employing subject-determined conditions allows one to rule out variability 
caused by inter-individual differences as what one participant regards as unusual 
and appropriate might be deemed as not unusual at all by another participant. 
The subject-determined conditions based on participant’s judgments of the 
unusualness and appropriateness of the phrases also sets the present study 
apart from conventional metaphor processing studies. The latter employ phrases 
or word pairs that are predetermined by the experimenter to be novel metaphoric, 
conventional metaphoric, nonsensical or literal (e.g., Arzouan et al., 2007; 
Balconi & Amenta, 2010; Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Lai et al., 2009). 
Moreover, participants’ tasks in metaphor processing studies either involve 
silently reading the presented material (Balconi & Amenta, 2010) or making a 
judgment about whether or not the stimuli are meaningful or appropriate 
(Arzouan et al., 2007; Lai et al., 2009). The present study, in contrast, asks 
participants for their judgment on both of the essential elements that characterize 
a creative response, namely unusualness and appropriateness. 
 In line with findings from studies on metaphor processing (e.g., Coulson & 
Van Petten, 2002; Lai et al., 2009), HULA (nonsense) and HUHA (novel 
metaphorical) phrases are expected to result in greater N400 amplitudes than 
LUHA (literal) phrases as a function of the higher degree of unusualness in case 
of the former conditions. Previous studies using novel metaphoric expressions 
and senseless expressions have reported a greater N400 amplitude for 
senseless expressions (e.g., Arzouan et al., 2007; De Grauwe et al., 2010). 
HULA (nonsense) phrases in the present experiment are comparable to 
senseless expressions as they are incoherent and meaningless phrases. HULA 
(nonsense) phrases are therefore expected to elicit the greatest N400 amplitude 
of the three conditions. HUHA (novel metaphorical) phrases would in turn be 
expected to elicit greater N400 amplitudes than LUHA (literal) phrases due to 
their unusualness, which is likely to lead to greater effort in semantic retrieval 
(e.g., Kutas & Van Petten, 1994). However, given that the eventual retrieval of 
the appropriate semantic information leads to novel associations being forged 
and integrated within the conceptual knowledge stores, it is expected that less 
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semantic integration difficulty should be encountered for HUHA (novel 
metaphorical) compared to HULA (nonsense) phrases. 
 Research on semantic processing also focuses on later ERP components, 
such as the P600, or late positive component, which has been discussed in 
terms of sentence-level integration (Kaan, Harris, Gibson, & Holcomb, 2000), 
reanalysis (Friederici, 1995) and additional retrieval from semantic memory (e.g., 
Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Paller & Kutas, 1992). The findings for this late 
component, however, are less consistent than for the N400 (e.g. Pynte, Besson, 
Robichon, & Poli, 1996). Due to the novelty of the current ERP paradigm as a 
tool to investigate creative processes, the analysis of later processing stages will 
be exploratory. 
 
 
4.3 Materials and methods 
4.3.1 Participants 
 
The original sample included 27 healthy right-handed students from the 
University of Giessen that participated in the study in exchange for course credit 
or monetary compensation (15 €). All participants were native German-speakers 
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Handedness was assessed using 
the German version of the Edinburgh Inventory of Handedness (Oldfield, 1971). 
Nine participants had to be excluded from data analyses due to excessive drifts 
in their EEG data (n = 1), admittance to the consumption of an illegal substance 
that might influence brain activity (n = 1) or an insufficient number of stimuli 
classified as unusual and appropriate (n = 7). This resulted in a final sample of 18 
participants (10 females). Mean age was 23.39 years (SD = 3.66). In order to 
ensure the homogeneity of the sample in terms of verbal intelligence participants 
completed the vocabulary subscale of the Hamburg Wechsler Intelligence Test 
for Adults (HAWIE, Tewes, 1994). Mean standardized HAWIE score was 12.89 
(SD = 1.13), with individual scores ranging from 11 to 14. The experimental 
standards of the study were approved by the Ethics Commission of the German 
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Psychological Society (DGPs). Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants prior to participation. 
 
 
4.3.2 Materials 
 
The study used a stimuli-set created for a previous fMRI study (Rutter et al., 
2012). The stimulus set consisted of 44 experimenter-determined sentence 
triplets (132 phrases in total) in perfect tense. Each sentence was composed of a 
noun, verb and object (for examples, see Table 1 and Table S1 in the 
supplementary material). The three sentences of each triplet only differed with 
regard to the verb which was chosen to make the meaning of the sentence novel 
metaphorical, nonsensical or literal corresponding to the three experimental 
conditions. Each participant was presented with all 132 phrases and the order of 
presentation of the stimuli was pseudo-randomized to ensure, for instance, that 
there were at least five trials presented between any two trials of a sentence-
triplet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 90 
Table 1: Example phrases for the three experimental conditions  
Critical word is printed in bold. The literal English translation of the example 
phrases is presented in brackets. A complete list of the stimuli is listed in the 
supplementary material. 
 
Condition Phrase 
Highly unusual – highly appropriate 
(HUHA) 
 
Die Wolken haben über der Stadt 
getanzt. 
(The clouds have danced over the city.) 
 
Highly unusual – low appropriate 
(HULA) 
 
Die Wolken haben über der Stadt 
gelesen. 
(The clouds have read over the city.) 
 
Low unusual – highly appropriate 
(LUHA) 
 
Die Wolken sind über die Stadt gezogen. 
(The clouds have moved over the city.) 
 
  
 
 Verbs were checked for word length and frequency of occurrence in the 
German language. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences in word 
length between the three experimental conditions (F(2, 129) = 3.14; p = .047; η2= 
.05). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons showed, however, that this 
effect was primarily driven by a trend in word length differences between the 
nonsensical verbs (HULA) and the literal verbs (LUHA) (m = 8.45, sd = 1.42 and 
m = 9.39, sd = 2.24, respectively; p = .051). Frequency of occurrence in the 
German language was computed using the online Vocabulary Database of the 
University of Leipzig in Germany (http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de/). This database 
classifies words into different frequency classes based on the frequency of their 
occurrence relative to the German definite article “der” (“the”). As the resulting 
frequency values are ordinal-scaled, a non-parametric median test was chosen. 
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The median test comparing the three experimenter-determined conditions 
confirmed that they did not differ significantly regarding the frequency of 
occurrence of the verb (md = 15 for HUHA and HULA, respectively, md = 14 for 
LUHA; p = .1).  
 
 
4.3.3 Procedure 
 
Participants were tested individually in one session. After applying the 
electrodes, participants were seated in front of a computer screen and keyboard. 
Participants completed a few practice trials to become familiar with the task. 
Stimuli were presented in black print on a grey background using Presentation 
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Albany, CA). Stimuli phrases were 
presented in the German language where the verb occupies the sentence-final 
position. Each trial (see Figure 1) began with the presentation of a fixation cross 
on the left side of the screen. Presentation time of the fixation cross was 
randomized and ranged from 1400 ms to 1800 ms in 200 ms steps. After a blank 
screen lasting 200 ms, the stimulus phrase without the last word (being the verb) 
was presented for 2000 ms, after which the verb appeared at the end of the 
phrase for another 2000 ms. Following a 500 ms blank screen, the questions 
“Unusual?” (in German: “Ungewöhnlich?) and “Appropriate?” (in German: 
”Sinnvoll?”) appeared for 1500 ms, respectively, separated by another 500 ms 
blank. During presentation of the respective questions, participants made “yes” or 
“no” judgments via button press with their right index or middle finger on the 
keyboard in front of them. To determine their response to the "Unusual"-question, 
participants were instructed to respond “yes” if the presented information was 
novel or unfamiliar to them and “no” if it was known or familiar. To determine their 
response to the "Appropriate"-question, they were also instructed to respond 
“yes” if the presented information was fitting or sensible and “no” if it was unfitting 
or nonsensical. After each trial, participants had the opportunity to take a break 
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and start the next trial via button press at their own pace. Stimuli were presented 
in a pseudo-randomized order.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Example of the experimental trial timeline. Total trial length from fixation cross to 
onset of the break was either 9600 ms, 9800 ms or 10000 ms. Stimuli phrases 
were presented in German where the critical word (verb) syntactically appears at 
the end of the phrase.  
 
 
4.3.4 Electrophysiological recording 
 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded continuously using the actiCAP 
system (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany) with 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes 
and monitored by the BrainVision recorder software. The EEG signal was 
amplified by the QuickAmp amplifier (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany) 
and digitized at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Impedances were kept under 5 kΩ. 
Eye movements were monitored through bipolar electrodes that were placed 
 93 
above and below the right eye, as well as at the left and right canthi. Data was 
recorded using an average-reference on-line. 
 
 
4.3.5 Data analysis 
 
For each participant, stimulus phrases were assigned to the three conditions 
based on their individual evaluations concerning the usualness and 
appropriateness of the phrase. This resulted in a differing number of cases per 
condition for each participant. To avoid underrepresentation of any one condition, 
participants with a disproportionate distribution of stimulus phrases between the 
three experimental conditions were excluded from data analysis. Cut-off criterion 
for exclusion of participants was determined at less than 28 instances in any one 
condition. Paired t-tests were carried out to detect possible differences in 
reaction times (RTs). As only RT differences between conditions that resulted in 
the same responses are of interest, RTs to the “unusual”-question were 
compared for the HUHA (metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) conditions and 
RTs to the “appropriate”-question were compared for the HUHA (metaphorical) 
and LUHA (literal) conditions. 
EEG data was analyzed using the Vision Analyzer 2.0 software (Brain 
Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany). Data was filtered with a 0.01 Hz high-pass 
and a 40 Hz low-pass filter. Ocular correction to remove eye movement artefacts 
was computed based on the method described by Gratton, Coles and Donchin 
(1983). Data was further segmented into epochs of 1150 ms duration, starting at 
150 ms before onset of the last word (further referred to as critical word). 
Segments were baseline-corrected using the 150 ms time window before onset 
of the critical word. Artefacts with amplitudes exceeding +/-75 µV were removed 
from the data set. For each participant, ERP averages for each one of the three 
conditions were computed6. Grand Averages for each condition were used to 
                                                 
6 Information on the mean number of segments per condition per subject that were included in the 
final analyses can be found in Table S2 in the supplementary material. 
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derive the temporal intervals for the ERP components. A negative-going wave 
starting at about 350 ms with a peak at 420 ms was observed, thus the mean 
amplitude for the time interval 350 ms to 500 ms after onset of the critical word 
was computed (N400). In order to investigate possible late ERP components, the 
mean amplitude for the time interval of 500 ms to 900 ms after onset of the 
critical word was also calculated (late component).  
For each of the ERP components of interest (N400; late component), a 
repeated measures ANOVA was computed with the factors Condition (HUHA, 
HULA, LUHA), Line (C-line, CP-line, P-line) and Electrode position (3, 1, z, 2, 4). 
The Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) was applied 
to all repeated measures with more than one degree of freedom. In these cases, 
corrected p-values with the original degrees of freedom are reported. In cases 
where main or interaction effects could be observed, additional planned pair-wise 
ANOVAs were carried out comparing each phrase category with one another. 
We focus on the main effects and interaction effects involving the factor 
Condition. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Behavioral data 
 
Table 2 shows means and standard deviations across the three conditions for 
each question. Comparing RTs to the “unusual”-question for HUHA (novel 
metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases revealed a significant difference 
between HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases, such that 
participants responded slower to the “unusual”-question for novel metaphorical 
phrases relative to nonsensical phrases (t17 = 2.25; p = .038). For the 
“appropriate”-question, the analysis comparing RTs to HUHA (novel 
metaphorical) and LUHA (literal) phrases revealed that participants took 
significantly longer to respond when presented with novel metaphorical phrases 
compared to literal phrases (t17 = 4.87; p < .001).  
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Table 2 
Mean reaction times in milliseconds across all three conditions for each question. 
Standard deviations are given in brackets. 
 
Condition                              Question 
 Unusual Appropriate 
HUHA (novel metaphoric) 815.0 (112.8) 666.9 (141.4) 
HULA (senseless) 775.6 (92.6) 596.2 (125.7) 
LUHA (literal) 785.9(153.4) 550.2 (106.8) 
 
 
 
4.4.2 ERP data 
 
Grand averages elicited by the experimental conditions at selected electrode 
sites are depicted in Figure 2. Figures for all 15 electrodes can be found in the 
supplementary material. A N100/P200 complex can be observed starting at 100 
ms after onset of the critical word. Around 350 ms after onset of the critical word 
a negative going component can be seen that peaks at around 420 ms and can 
thus be regarded as the N400 component. After the N400 peak, the waveform 
shows a late ERP component of sustained negativity, starting at about 500 ms. 
 
N400. The repeated measures ANOVA with factors Condition (HUHA, HULA, 
LUHA), Line (C, CP, P) and Electrode site (3, 1, z, 2, 4) revealed a significant 
main effect of Condition (F(2, 34) = 8.91; p = .001; η2= .34) in the time window 
between 350 ms and 500 ms after critical word onset as well as a significant 
linear trend between the three conditions (F(1, 17) = 15.99; p = .001; η2 = .49). 
The linear trend (Figure 3) indicates that the results can be best understood in 
terms of a linear function such that the N400 was largest in response HULA 
(nonsense) phrases, followed by HUHA (novel metaphoric) phrases, both relative 
to the LUHA (literal) phrases (N400: HULA > HUHA > LUHA). 
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 Three planned pair-wise ANOVAs were carried out to compare each of the 
conditions individually with one another (HUHA vs. HULA, HUHA vs. LUHA and 
HULA vs. LUHA). The comparisons revealed that the waveforms elicited by 
HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases for the N400 time-
window were not significantly distinguishable from one another7. However, the 
waveforms elicited by both these phrase types were significantly differentiable 
from that of the LUHA (literal) phrases. HUHA (novel metaphorical) phrases 
resulted in a more negative N400 than LUHA (literal) phrases, as indicated by a 
significant main effect Condition (F(1, 17) = 7.50; p = .014; η2 = .31). A significant 
interaction effect between Condition and Line revealed that the differences in 
N400 amplitude are limited to central and centroparietal regions (F(2, 34) = 4.77; 
p = .033; η2 = .22). HULA (nonsense) phrases also produced a more negative 
N400 than LUHA (literal) phrases, as indicated by a significant main effect 
Condition (F(1, 17) = 15.99; p = .001; η2 = .49). A significant three-way 
interaction effect between factors Condition, Line and Electrode position (F(8, 
136) = 2.61; p = .037; η2= .13) showed that HULA phrases produced a more 
negative amplitude than LUHA phrases on 12 out of 15 electrodes (significant 
differences on electrodes C3, C1, Cz, C2, C4, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, P3, Pz, and 
P4, all p < .05). The lack of two-way interaction effects between the factors 
Condition and Line or Condition and Electrode position in this analysis indicates 
that the effects of the experimental conditions found for HULA and LUHA do not 
appear to be limited to a certain site or hemisphere. 
  
 
                                                 
7 No significant N400 differences were found between HUHA and HULA even in additional 
analyses where a wider set of electrodes (including frontal electrodes) were analyzed. 
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Figure 2 
Grand Averages on central electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz, as well as on C2 and P4. 
Vertical line at time point 0 marks onset of the critical word (verb). Gray lines 
mark onset of N400 and sustained negativity (SN), respectively. Negative values 
are plotted upwards on y- axis in µV. Time is given in milliseconds. Figures for all 
15 electrodes can be found in the Supplementary Material. 
 
 
Sustained negativity. The findings of the sustained negativity late component 
closely parallel those of the N400. The repeated measures ANOVA between the 
factors Condition (HUHA, HULA, LUHA), Line (C, CP, P) and Electrode position 
(3, 1, z, 2, 4) revealed a significant main effect of Condition (F(2, 34) = 8.36; p = 
.001; η2= .33) in the time window between 500 ms and 900 ms after critical word 
onset, as well as a significant three-way interaction between the factors 
Condition, Line and Electrode position (F(16, 272) = 2.12; p = .042; η2= .11). 
Additionally, the results showed a significant linear trend between the three 
conditions (F(1, 17) = 16.37; p = .001; η2 = .49). The linear trend (Figure 3) 
indicates that the results can be best understood in terms of a linear function 
such that the sustained negativity was largest in response to HULA (nonsense) 
phrases, followed by HUHA (novel metaphorical) phrases , both relative to the 
LUHA (literal) phrases (sustained negativity: HULA > HUHA > LUHA). To fully 
explore the extent of these effects, three planned pair-wise ANOVAs were 
carried out to compare each of the conditions individually with one another 
(HUHA vs. HULA; HUHA vs. LUHA; HULA vs. LUHA). 
Comparison between HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) 
showed a significant three-way interaction between the factors Condition, Line 
and Electrode position (F(8, 136) = 3.04; p = .013; η2 = .15). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the mean amplitude of HUHA phrases (novel 
metaphorical) was less negative than the mean amplitude of HULA phrases 
(nonsense) on 3 out of 15 electrodes (significant differences on electrodes C2, 
CPz and P4, all p < .05). HUHA (novel metaphorical) continued to result in a 
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more negative waveform than LUHA (literal) phrases, as indicated by the 
significant main effect of Condition (F(1, 17) = 5.82; p = .027; η2 = .26). Just as in 
the case of HUHA (novel metaphorical) phrases, HULA (nonsense) phrases also 
continued to remain more negative than LUHA (literal) phrases during this late 
time-window, as indicated by a significant main effect of Condition (F(1, 17) = 
16.37; p = .001; η2 = .49). 
The lack of interaction effects between factors Condition and Line or 
Condition and Electrode position on the sustained negativity indicate that the 
effects of experimental conditions do not appear to be limited to a certain site or 
hemisphere.  
 
 
Figure 3 
Mean amplitude of the three conditions for the N400 and the sustained negativity. 
Plots are based on collapsed data over all 15 electrodes. Error bars indicate 
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standard errors. The linear trend from the repeated measures ANOVAs for both 
components is significant. 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
The main goal of the present study was to use ERPs to draw a clearer picture on 
how conceptual expansion as a creative cognitive process can be aligned with 
established aspects of brain function. Together with the advantage of having a 
high temporal resolution that made it possible to time-lock the creative process, 
the novel approach allowed for individual differences in the ability to expand 
existing concepts to be taken into consideration on a trial-by-trial basis. The short 
trial duration together with an adequate number of trials ensured a sufficient 
number of instances for each participant and consequently an optimal group 
average response. Another advantage of the novel approach lies in the 
possibility of clearly separating instances that are merely original (unusualness: 
HULA, nonsensical phrases) or relevant (appropriateness: LUHA, literal phrases) 
from instances that are creative in that they are both original and relevant 
(conceptual expansion: HUHA, novel metaphoric phrases). 
 
 
4.5.1 N400 
 
The findings for the early time-window between 350 and 500 ms showed a 
graded effect of the three experimental conditions on the N400 amplitude with 
LUHA (literal) phrases resulting in the least negative waveform, followed by 
HUHA (novel metaphorical) and then the HULA (nonsense) phrases. It is to be 
noted, however, that HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases 
did not differ significantly in the direct comparisons. Instead, this subtle and 
graded effect could be gleaned from the linear trend of the main effect within the 
repeated measures analysis. A similar pattern has been reported in several 
 101 
studies from the field of language comprehension. For instance, Arzouan and 
colleagues (2007) found such a graded N400 modification when investigating 
literal, conventional metaphoric, novel metaphoric and unrelated word pairs. 
More recently, DeGrauwe et al. (2010) found this graded N400 modification for 
both mid-sentence and sentence-final words, which is in line with other studies 
on metaphor processing (e.g., Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Coulson & Van 
Petten, 2007; Lai et al., 2009; Pynte et al., 1996; Tartter, Gomes, Dubrovsky, 
Molholm, & Stewart, 2002).  
Graded N400 amplitudes for different types of phrases have been 
interpreted in terms of conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998) in 
language processing. The conceptual blending theory postulates that the 
construction of multiple cognitive models and mappings between their 
components are the underlying processes for language comprehension. Greater 
N400 amplitudes for metaphorical or nonsensical expressions, for instance, are 
consequently interpreted as reflecting greater effort to construe mappings 
between distantly related domains and their components as well as the activation 
of background knowledge regarding the distant domains to derive meaning 
(Arzouan et al., 2007). The assumptions and interpretations of findings in this 
field can be extended and applied to the current results.  
Taken together with the claim that the N400 component indexes higher-
level integrative processes shown in semantic priming studies (e.g., Brown & 
Hagoort, 1993; Brown, Hagoort, & Chwilla, 2000; Holcomb, 1993), greater N400 
amplitudes for HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases 
compared to LUHA (literal) phrases in the current study can be seen as indexing 
greater efforts to establish a connection between the two semantically distant 
concepts conveyed through the stimuli. For LUHA (literal) phrases the derivation 
of meaning appears to be comparatively effortless since the phrases are literal in 
their nature (e.g., moving clouds) and represent established links between 
strongly associated concepts. In contrast, HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA 
(nonsense) phrases are both novel (e.g., dancing clouds; reading clouds) and 
require the integration of two unrelated concepts. The effort associated with this 
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endeavor seems to be greatest for phrases that participants categorized as 
HULA (nonsense) due to their senselessness (e.g., reading clouds) and the 
inability to successfully integrate the two concepts to be associated with one 
another. Although the HUHA (novel metaphorical) phrases were unusual and 
unfamiliar to the participants, it was possible to successfully integrate the two 
presented concepts to give rise to a novel conceptual combination (e.g., dancing 
clouds).  Even though the absolute difference in N400 amplitude triggered by 
HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases did not reach 
significance, the linear trend findings support this interpretation.  
Such a rationale is also in line with findings from a study by Rhodes and 
Donaldson (2008) where an N400 modulation was reported for word pairs with 
only an associative connection or for word pairs with a semantic and an 
associative connection, both relative to unrelated word pairs. In the current 
experiment, HUHA (novel metaphorical) phrases were not previously linked 
through association. A new semantic connection was established through the 
expansion of the existing concepts during the course of the experiment. The fact 
that this connection could be successfully established in the case of the HUHA 
(novel metaphorical) phrases but not the HULA (nonsense) phrases may account 
for the partially lower N400 amplitude accompanying the HUHA (novel 
metaphorical) compared to the HULA (nonsense) phrases. Further research is 
needed to confirm this interpretation. It is of note that the differing effort for 
integration observable in the graded N400 modulation is not apparent from the 
behavioral data. The behavioral data showed that RTs were highest for HUHA 
(novel metaphorical) phrases, whereas the ERP data revealed that the HULA 
(nonsense) phrases were accompanied by the most negative N400 amplitude. 
The N400 findings indicate the greater integrational effort involved in HULA 
(nonsense) relative to HUHA (novel metaphorical) and LUHA (literal) phrases 
(N400: HULA> HUHA> LUHA). 
An alternative interpretation of the N400 treats this component as an index 
for the effort to retrieve semantic knowledge from memory stores in the brain 
(e.g., Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Kutas, et al., 2006). Both HUHA (novel 
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metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases entail unusualness and it can be 
argued that the increased N400 amplitude for these conditions reflects an 
increased effort to search for semantic information regarding the novel concepts 
imparted through the phrases. The data provided through the present study does 
not suffice to fully clarify whether the greater N400 amplitude for HUHA (novel 
metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases reflects semantic memory retrieval 
or higher-order integrative processes. Further research will be needed to decide 
on the exact nature of the processes indexed by the N400 during a conceptual 
expansion task.  
It could be argued that cloze probability might be a further explanation for 
greater N400 amplitudes for HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) 
compared to LUHA (literal) phrases as some studies have shown N400 
modifications based on degree of expectedness associated with the sentences 
(Kutas & Hillyard, 1984). While HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA 
(nonsense) phrases are both unusual or novel and are therefore both 
unexpected in the given context, to solely base the interpretation of the N400 
differences on the violation of semantic expectations does not suffice to explain 
the full extent of possible cognitive processing that can be reflected by this ERP 
component in the current study. The highly significant linear trend suggests the 
presence of processes exceeding merely expectation violations and it therefore 
appears to be more fitting to view these violations of semantic expectations as a 
catalyst that activates the enhanced retrieval and integration efforts discussed 
above.  
 
 
4.5.2 Sustained negativity 
 
The analysis of the later time-window in the current study was exploratory and 
the results from the late component were found to closely correspond to the 
N400 findings. ERP studies on language comprehension have lead to 
heterogeneous findings concerning the late time-window. Some studies report 
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the emergence of a P600 component after the N400 when processing 
ambiguous sentences (Friederici, 1995) and metaphors (Coulson & Van Petten, 
2002; De Grauwe et al., 2010) whereas Pynte et al. (1996) did not find a P600 
component for metaphors compared to literal sentences.  
HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA (nonsense) phrases in the present 
study did not elicit greater P600 components compared to literal phrases, but 
instead showed an ongoing negativity in the later time-window. Sustained 
negativities have been conceived as indexing different cognitive processes. 
Ruchkin and colleagues (Ruchkin, Johnson, Mahaffey, & Sutton, 1988) have 
linked slow negative waves to stimuli that are conceptually difficult to process, an 
interpretation that would be fitting for the stimuli at hand as well. However, the 
waveform described in their study differed in onset and latency from the 
waveform found in the present study.  
Rhodes and Donaldson (2008) found a similar more negative going wave 
in a later time-window for unrelated word pairs relative to semantically or 
associatively connected pairs as in the current study. This was interpreted as 
recollection from long-term memory for the semantically and associatively linked 
pairs. This is in reference to old/new memory effects and episodic retrieval 
operations as described by Greve, van Rossum and Donaldson (2007) and 
Donaldson and Rugg (1998) among others. However, the effect described in 
their work is limited to the left parietal areas and may therefore not suffice to be 
applicable to the interpretation of the effect found in the present study given that 
the discussed effect was not limited to a certain location. 
The effect observable in the later time-window manifested itself as a 
continuation of the effects observed for the earlier time-window, namely a more 
negative-going waveform for both HUHA (novel metaphorical) and HULA 
(nonsense) phrases relative to LUHA (literal) phrases. In the case of the 
sustained negativity however, both the direct comparisons as well as the linear 
trend of the condition main effect demonstrated  a graded effect of the three 
experimental conditions with LUHA (literal) phrases resulting in most pronounced 
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negative waveform, followed by HUHA (novel metaphorical) and then the HULA 
(nonsense) phrases. 
Recent ideas by Jiang, Than and Zhou (2009) on sustained negativity 
might be applicable to the current results in this light. In a series of studies on 
how violations of universal quantifiers in sentences are processed (e.g., the 
universal quantifier "all" was mismatched with a noun in singular object, as in "He 
threw away all that apple"), the authors found a sustained negativity, but no 
N400, on verb onset for violations of the quantifier (Jiang, Tan, & Zhou, 2009). 
The sustained negativity was conceived of as a reinterpretation of the verb after 
a mismatch between the phrase and the quantifier. The negativity was therefore 
proposed to index a reinterpretation process after an initial failure to reach 
meaning.  
A similar underlying process is conceivable to explain the late negativity in 
the present study. Continuing the process indexed by the N400 associated with 
the establishment of a connection between two semantically distant concepts, 
the late negativity may mark the ongoing difficulty of integrating the two concepts. 
In the case of HUHA (novel metaphorical) phrases, the integration is eventually 
successful which could account for why the waveform becomes more positive in 
the later time-window and converges to the level of the LUHA (literal) phrases. 
The continued inability to bring together the concepts from the HULA (nonsense) 
phrases though is likely to have contributed to the continued negativity 
associated with this condition. It must be noted, however, that unlike in the 
present study, Jiang and colleagues (2009) did not report a preceding N400 for 
the sustained negativity and their primary focus lay on the processing of 
language comprehension.  
Given the similarity of the N400 effects and the effects observed in the 
later time-window, it could be argued that the two components can be seen as 
one single sustained effect. When taking the linear trend and the direct 
comparisons into consideration which show a graded effect for the three 
conditions, it also seems plausible that two separate effects can be observed. 
Especially, the finding that waveform associated with the HUHA (metaphorical) 
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phrases becomes significantly different from the waveform elicited by HULA 
(nonsense) phrases supports the existence of two distinguishable effects. 
However, the postulations on the significance behind the condition-based 
negativity and the question of whether or not  the observed effects are indeed 
one single sustained effect in the present study on creative cognition are post-
hoc and therefore require further research to be fully clarified. Follow-up studies 
are necessary to fully understand the implications of this late ERP component 
together with the N400 in the context of creative cognition. 
Taken together, the findings from the present study provide a first insight 
into which ERP components are important in indexing the operation of passive 
conceptual expansion as a creative cognitive process. As the paradigm of the 
present study used a passive conceptual expansion task, interpretation of the 
findings is certainly limited to this field and cannot be generalized to other 
creative processes, such as creative imagery. Conceptual expansion is only one 
among many cognitive operations that form the complex construct of creativity 
and cannot alone be held responsible for creative achievements. An important 
next step in the investigation of creative cognition will be to replicate the present 
findings in an active conceptual expansion task, as well as carrying out ERP 
investigations of other creative cognitive processes. 
 
 
4.5.3 Conclusion 
 
The present study was aimed at assessing conceptual expansion as a vital 
process of creative cognition using ERPs. The novelty of the employed paradigm 
was twofold. Unlike previous studies on metaphor processing for instance, 
participants were asked to judge not only the appropriateness but also the 
unusualness of the stimuli. The participants’ judgments on these two defining 
aspects of creativity were then used to classify the stimuli into different 
conditions. This rendered it possible to incorporate individual differences in the 
organization and reorganization of existing conceptual knowledge within the 
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paradigm. The results showed not only a clear difference within the N400 and the 
late sustained negativity components between nonsensical and creative phrases 
relative to literal phrases, but also a graded N400 and sustained negativity 
modulation for nonsensical, creative and literal phrases (in that order).  
 The N400 component was interpreted as reflecting the effort necessary to 
establish a connection between two unrelated concepts. The late negative 
component is postulated to be an indicator of a reanalysis process and ongoing 
effort. More research is needed, however, to clarify the cognitive operations 
underlying this late ERP component.  
Taken together, the results support the notion of conceptual expansion as 
a continuous process involving different cognitive operations, such as semantic 
information retrieval, the formation of new associations between concepts and 
semantic integration processes. The current findings suggest that these different 
operations are not exclusively indexed by one specific ERP component, but are 
rather jointly represented by different ERP components. The results from the 
present study contribute greatly to the understanding of verbal creativity and 
parallel findings from fMRI investigations on verbal creativity that have 
demonstrated the involvement of similar brain regions during creative cognition 
as commonly found in semantic cognition such as the inferior frontal gyrus and 
the orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., Fink et al., 2009; Howard-Jones, Blakemore, 
Samuel, Summers, & Claxton, 2005; Kröger et al., 2012; Rutter et al., 2012). The 
current findings show that ERP components known to index semantic operations 
can be explored further to understand the dynamics underlying creative cognitive 
processes as well.  
 The experimental paradigm employed in the current study is the first 
systematic investigation of creative cognition using ERPs. The findings of the 
present study attest to the fact that using an event-related electrophysiological 
approach provides a rich and novel avenue to explore further relevant questions 
that can provide genuine insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying 
creative thinking.  
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4.7 Supplementary Material 
 
Table S1 Complete list of stimuli phrases used in the experiment and the 
corresponding classification proportions (in %) by the participants of each 
stimulus within each category. Stimuli phrases were presented in German. 
Critical word is printed in bold.  
 
HUHA (highly unusual – highly appropriate) HUHA HULA LUHA Error 
Der Wind hat die Bäume gekitzelt.                 61.1 0 33.3 5.6 
Das Wasser hat den Schwimmer umarmt.            94.4 0 5.6 0 
Der Forscher hat eine Theorie geboren.        77.8 0 22.2 0 
Das Riff hat die Fische verschluckt.           77.8 22.2 0 0 
Die Wolken haben über der Stadt getanzt. 72.2 5.6 22.2 0 
Der Mond hat die Welt getröstet.             55.6 33.3 0 11.1 
Die Frau hat ihm Worte ins Ohr geträufelt.       83.3 16.7 0 0 
Die Sternschnuppen haben den Himmel zerschnitten. 61.1 27.8 11.1 0 
Der Garten ist im Winter gestorben.            77.8 11.1 11.1 0 
Der Regen hat die Lippen geküsst.    77.8 11.1 0 11.1 
Die Biene hat die Blüte bezirzt.               61.1 11.1 27.8 0 
Die Wolkendecke hat das Land erstickt.     66.7 16.7 16.7 0 
Die Früchte haben den Kuchen vergoldet.         61.1 11.1 27.8 0 
Die Melodie ist durch die Luft geflattert.      83.3 5.6 11.1 0 
Der Sturm hat die Düne verscheucht.           83.3 11.1 0 5.6 
Der Surfer hat mit den Wellen gerangelt.           66.7 16.7 11.1 5.6 
Der Wurm hat sich durch den Apfel geschraubt. 83.3 0 16.7 0 
Die Gestirne haben über dem Meer geschwiegen. 27.8 72.2 0 0 
Die Hitze hat den Boden vernarbt.           66.7 22.2 5.6 5.6 
Die Sonne hat auf die Erde eingehämmert. 55.6 33.1 0 11.1 
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Die Fahne hat sich im Wind geräkelt. 77.8 16.7 5.6 0 
Das Erdbeben hat die Stadt aufgefressen.           83.3 11.1 5.6 0 
Das Laub ist von den Bäumen getaumelt.           72.2 16.7 11.1 0 
Der Efeu hat den Baum erstickt.                  61.1 22.2 16.7 0 
Die Sonne hat den Tau getrunken.                 83.3 16.7 0 0 
Die Schwerkraft hat den Mond gefesselt.         61.1 33.3 5.6 0 
Der Poet hat seine Gedanken eingefroren.          50.0 38.9 11.1 0 
Der Vulkan hat die Lava herausgewürgt.         77.8 5.6 11.1 5.6 
Der Traum hat die Richtung geleuchtet.            66.7 22.2 5.6 5.6 
Das Bächlein ist durch den Wald gehuscht.          61.1 38.9 0 0 
Das Gewitter hat Blitze gehustet.                 72.2 27.8 0 0 
Die Sterne haben über der Wüste gelauert.         55.6 33.3 5.6 5.6 
Die Nacht hat die Sterne entzündet.               83.3 5.6 0 11.1 
Die Sirene hat über der Stadt gesungen.             72.2 5.6 16.6 5.6 
Das Echo ist durch die Höhle gezittert.            55.6 38.9 0 5.6 
Die Wellen haben den Strand ertränkt.             83.3 11.1 5.6 0 
Das Lied ist ihr ins Ohr gehüpft.                   77.8 16.7 0 5.6 
Der Morgentau hat auf der Wiese geschlafen.          83.3 16.6 0 0 
Der Schnee hat den Boden verschlungen.             66.7 11.1 22.2 0 
Die Gewitterwolken sind über die Felder galoppiert. 66.7 22.2 5.6 5.6 
Der Musiker hat die Geige geneckt.                  50.0 44.4 5.6 0 
Das Gelächter ist aus den Fenstern getropft.       55.6 44.4 0 0 
Die Sonne hat hinter den Wolken geschmollt.         77.8 11.1 5.6 5.6 
Die Liebe ist mit der Zeit versunken.               61.1 22.2 11.1 5.6 
HULA (highly unusual – low appropriate)     
Der Wind hat die Bäume angezündet.                0 94.4 5.6 0 
Das Wasser hat den Schwimmer vergessen.              5.6 83.3 11.1 0 
Der Forscher hat eine Theorie geteert.                5.6 88.9 0 5.6 
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Das Riff hat die Fische verboten.                    0 100 0 0 
Die Wolken haben über der Stadt gelesen.            11.1 83.3 0 5.6 
Der Mond hat die Welt gegessen.                      5.6 94.4 0 0 
Die Frau hat ihm Worte ans Ohr genäht.              27.8 72.2 0 0 
Die Sternschnuppen haben den Himmel umgetauscht.     5.6 88.9 0 5.6 
Der Garten ist im Winter kondensiert.                0 88.9 5.6 5.6 
Der Regen hat die Lippen geflochten.                 0 100 0 0 
Die Biene hat die Blüte getöpfert.                  5.6 94.4 0 0 
Die Wolkendecke hat das Land gebraten.               0 100 0 0 
Die Früchte haben den Kuchen gesehen.               22.2 72.2 0 5.6 
Die Melodie ist durch die Luft gebohrt.              38.9 55.6 0 5.6 
Der Sturm hat die Düne gebraten.                   16.7 77.8 0 5.6 
Der Surfer hat mit den Wellen telefoniert.           0 94.4 0 5.6 
Der Wurm hat sich durch den Apfel geschnarcht.       5.6 94.4 0 0 
Die Gestirne haben über dem Meer gekeimt.           16.7 83.3 0 0 
Die Hitze hat den Boden gewischt.                   0 100 0 0 
Die Sonne hat auf die Erde geregnet.                22.2 66.7 5.6 5.6 
Die Fahne hat sich im Wind geduscht.                5.6 94.4 0 0 
Das Erdbeben hat die Stadt aufgetaut.               0 83.3 5.6 11.1 
Das Laub ist von den Bäumen geronnen.             27.8 66.8 5.6 0 
Der Efeu hat den Baum verglast.                   5.6 83.3 5.6 5.6 
Die Sonne hat den Tau geleimt.                     5.6 94.4 0 0 
Die Schwerkraft hat den Mond getauft.              0 94.4 5.6 0 
Der Poet hat seine Gedanken gedünstet.              0 100 0 0 
Der Vulkan hat die Lava gehämmert.                 22.2 72.2 0 5.6 
Der Traum hat die Richtung rasiert.                  0 100 0 0 
Das Bächlein ist durch den Wald geradelt.            11.1 77.8 0 11.1 
Das Gewitter hat Blitze getrocknet.                 0 94.4 0 5.6 
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Die Sterne haben über der Wüste gemäht.           0 88.9 5.6 5.6 
Die Nacht hat die Sterne gebrochen.                 5.6 83.3 0 11.1 
Die Sirene hat über der Stadt gebügelt.          0 94.4 0 5.6 
Das Echo ist durch die Höhle gepinselt.             11.1 88.9 0 0 
Die Wellen haben den Strand ausgewildert.           11.1 83.3 5.6 0 
Das Lied ist ihr ins Ohr gerudert.                   11.1 88.9 0 0 
Der Morgentau hat auf der Wiese debattiert.           0 88.9 5.6 5.6 
Der Schnee hat den Boden poliert.                   22.2 72.2 0 5.6 
Die Gewitterwolken sind über die Felder gezuckelt.   77.8 5.6 5.6 11.1 
Der Musiker hat die Geige gebacken.                  5.6 83.3 5.6 5.6 
Das Gelächter ist aus den Fenstern geschehen.        11.1 77.8 11.1 0 
Die Sonne hat hinter den Wolken gestrickt.            0 94.4 5.6 0 
Die Liebe ist mit der Zeit vermalt.                  22.2 72.2 0 5.6 
LUHA (low unusual – highly appropriate)     
Der Wind hat die Bäume umgeweht.                    5.6 0 94.4 0 
Das Wasser hat den Schwimmer durchnässt.            27.8 11.1 61.1 0 
Der Forscher hat eine Theorie entwickelt.            5.6 5.6 83.3 5.6 
Das Riff hat die Fische beheimatet.                  16.7 5.6 72.2 5.6 
Die Wolken sind über die Stadt gezogen.              0 0 100 0 
Der Mond hat die Welt erhellt.                     11.1 0 88.9 0 
Die Frau hat ihm Worte ins Ohr geflüstert.           0 0 94.4 5.6 
Die Sternschnuppen haben den Himmel erleuchtet.     5.6 5.6 83.3 5.6 
Der Garten ist im Winter erfroren.                   16.7 11.1 61.1 11.1 
Der Regen hat die Lippen benetzt.                   27.8 5.6 66.7 0 
Die Biene hat die Blüte verlassen.                   5.6 5.6 83.3 5.6 
Die Wolkendecke hat das Land verdunkelt.             5.6 0 88.9 5.6 
Die Früchte haben den Kuchen umgeben.              22.2 27.8 33.3 16.7 
Die Melodie ist durch die Luft gezogen.               50 0 50 0 
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Der Sturm hat die Düne verweht.                     0 0 100 0 
Der Surfer ist mit den Wellen geschwommen.           11.1 5.6 83.3 0 
Der Wurm hat sich durch den Apfel gefressen.         5.6 0 94.4 0 
Die Gestirne haben über dem Meer gestrahlt.          5.6 11.1 83.3 0 
Die Hitze hat den Boden ausgetrocknet.              0 0 100 0 
Die Sonne hat auf die Erde geschienen.              11.1 0 88.9 0 
Die Fahne hat sich im Wind gedreht.                 0 5.6 94.4 0 
Das Erdbeben hat die Stadt verwüstet.               0 0 100 0 
Das Laub ist von den Bäumen gefallen.               0 0 94.4 5.6 
Der Efeu hat den Baum überwuchert.                 5.6 0 94.4 0 
Die Sonne hat den Tau verdunstet.                   11.1 5.6 77.8 5.6 
Die Schwerkraft hat den Mond beeinflusst.            11.1 0 66.7 22.2 
Der Poet hat seine Gedanken aufgeschrieben.          5.6 0 88.9 5.6 
Der Vulkan hat die Lava herausgeschossen.           5.6 0 94.4 0 
Der Traum hat die Richtung gewiesen.                22.2 0 77.8 0 
Das Bächlein ist durch den Wald geflossen.          5.6 0 94.4 0 
Das Gewitter hat Blitze hervorgebracht.              11.1 0 88.9 0 
Die Sterne haben über der Wüste geschienen.        5.6 5.6 83.3 5.6 
Die Nacht hat die Sterne sichtbar gemacht.           16.7 5.6 72.2 5.6 
Die Sirene hat über der Stadt geheult.               11.1 0 83.3 5.6 
Das Echo hat durch die Höhle geschallt.             0 0 94.4 5.6 
Die Wellen haben den Strand überflutet.            0 5.6 83.3 11.1 
Das Lied ist ihr ins Ohr gedrungen.               11.1 5.6 83.3 0 
Der Morgentau hat auf der Wiese gelegen.            5.6 0 88.9 5.6 
Der Schnee hat den Boden bedeckt.                  5.6 0 83.3 11.1 
Die Gewitterwolken sind über die Felder gezogen.     5.6 0 94.4 0 
Der Musiker hat die Geige gespielt.                 0 0 94.4 5.6 
Das Gelächter ist aus den Fenstern gedrungen.        0 0 100 0 
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Die Sonne hat hinter den Wolken geschienen.              5.6 0 88.9 5.6 
Die Liebe ist mit der Zeit vergangen.                 0 0 94.4 5.6 
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Table S2 Mean number of segments per condition per subject included in the 
final ERP analyses. 
 
Subject HUHA HULA LUHA 
1 41 50.7 37 
2 38 44 43 
3 40.9 47 43 
4 45 44 43 
5 35 53 43 
6 41 45 43 
7 41 45.9 44 
8 43.8 40.4 44.1 
9 41 45 31 
10 38 51 41 
11 32.4 43.8 45.8 
12 35.8 41.3 43.3 
13 29.8 52.7 39.2 
14 28 57.2 39.9 
15 52 40.9 37 
16 28 47 40 
17 30 61 41 
18 50 31 47.9 
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Figure S3 
Grand averages for all 15 electrodes included in the analyses. 
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Figure S4  
(a) Topographical distribution of the N400 effect for each of the three conditions. 
(b) Topographical distribution of the effect in the later time-window for each of the 
three conditions. 
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5 General discussion and implications 
 
The above reported studies used two different methods to investigate the neural 
correlates of one creative cognitive process, namely conceptual expansion. The 
studies applied a novel paradigm which passively induced conceptual expansion 
within participants. Whereas the hypotheses for the fMRI study could only be 
partially confirmed, the results regarding the earlier ERP component conformed 
to a priori predictions. Nevertheless, the two studies and their respective findings 
are subject to certain limitations. The findings of the studies as well as their 
respective limitations and implications will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
5.1 Discussion of fMRI results 
 
One of the studies used fMRI to assess participant’s brain activity while they read 
and judged sentences on their unusualness and appropriateness. By choosing 
the statistical method of conjunction analysis, it was possible to differentiate brain 
activities caused by the novelty or the appropriateness of the sentences from 
brain activity that was caused by conceptual expansion as a creative cognitive 
operation.  
 Conceptual expansion was hypothesized to result in greater brain 
activations in the anterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; BA 45/47), the middle 
temporal gyrus (MTG; BA 20 and BA 21), and the frontopolar cortex (FPC; BA 
10). The results obtained by this study were fully in line with the predictions of 
brain activity in the anterior IFG and the frontopolar cortex, but were not 
supported in the case of the MTG.  
 The present findings confirmed the involvement of the anterior IFG when 
participants judged a phrase as unusual and appropriate, thereby conveying 
conceptual expansion. This finding is in line with several other studies that have 
linked this particular region to an increased effort when retrieving semantic 
information and  with greater demands on semantic selection (e.g., Thompson-
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Schill et al., 1997; Wagner, Pare-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001; Wig, Miller, 
Kingstone, & Kelley, 2004), as well as to greater semantic distance in analogical 
mapping (Green et al., 2010). Greater activation in the anterior IFG when 
processing novel metaphoric phrases that were deemed to be both highly 
unusual and highly appropriate in the present study indicates that these phrases 
require greater effort to retrieve and select semantic information about the two 
semantically distant concepts conveyed through the phrases.  
 The role of the anterior IFG in semantic processing is unquestionable. 
However, its precise role is still under debate, as is discussed in more detail in 
section 3.5.1. While Wagner and colleagues (2001) see the area's role in the 
controlled retrieval of semantic knowledge, Thompson-Schill and colleagues 
(1997) argue for its importance in semantic selection. Badre and colleagues 
(2005) integrate both roles of the anterior IFG, assigning retrieval and selection 
of semantic information to different subregions. The present study and its results 
cannot clarify the specific role of the anterior IFG in semantic processing. 
Phrases conveying conceptual expansion rather seem to require both the 
retrieval and the selection of appropriate semantic knowledge to a greater extent 
than literal phrases in order to make sense of the novel combination of concepts 
encountered in unusual and appropriate phrases.  
 Hypotheses about the involvement of the middle temporal gyrus (MTG; BA 
20 and BA 21) in the process of conceptual expansion could not be fully 
confirmed in the present study. However, the results showed greater activation in 
the temporal pole (BA 38) when processing unusual and appropriate phrases. 
This finding is in line with an account by Badre and colleagues (2005) postulating 
a two-step model of semantic memory. According to this account, semantic 
memory is stored in the temporal poles and its retrieval is controlled by the left 
anterior ventrolateral inferior frontal cortex. Results of the present study are in 
line with this proposed model of semantic memory as both IFG (BA45/47) and 
temporal pole (BA 38) were activated when participants processed phrases that 
were judged by them to be unusual and appropriate. This implicates that 
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semantic selection, controlled semantic retrieval and semantic storage related 
processes are recruited during conceptual expansion. 
 Results of the present study also indicate the involvement of the 
frontopolar cortex (FPC; BA 10) when processing phrases that require 
conceptual expansion. This region has previously been discussed in terms of 
integrating the outcome of multiple cognitive operations (Ramnani & Owen, 
2004), processing highly complex stimuli in a reasoning task (Kroger et al., 
2002), as well as integrating semantically distant relations in analogical 
reasoning (Green et al., 2010; Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 
2012). All of these discussed functions of the region apply to the results obtained 
in the present study. Phrases that induce conceptual expansion recruit multiple 
cognitive processes, such as the retrieval and selection of semantic information, 
whose outcomes have to be integrated to connect two formerly unconnected or 
only weakly connected concepts in a novel and meaningful manner. In a recent 
study, Green and colleagues (2012) showed that frontopolar activation increased 
as a function of semantic distance between two stimuli in an analogical reasoning 
task. The authors interpret these results in terms of the role of the frontopolar 
cortex as an integration mechanism. Furthermore, semantically more distant 
analogies were rated as more creative. The results and respective interpretation 
of this study furthermore support the found activation of the frontopolar cortex in 
the present work as phrases conveying conceptual expansion require the 
integration of semantically very distant concepts.  
 Some studies suggest that relational integration within the frontopolar 
cortex is achieved through the manipulation of self-generated or self-inferred 
information (Christoff et al., 2001; Christoff, Ream, Geddes, & Gabrieli, 2003). 
This idea strongly supports the notion that a passive and indirect approach is 
suitable to investigate conceptual expansion. Even though participants did not 
have to volitionally and actively expand existing concepts, deriving a judgment 
about the unusualness and appropriateness of the encountered stimuli was still 
self-inferred by participants. 
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 The neural correlates common to novelty processing (novel metaphoric 
and nonsense expressions) and appropriateness processing (novel metaphoric 
and literal expressions) were also analyzed in the study. Although the processing 
of novelty was expected to lead to greater activation in the anterior IFG (BA 
45/47), the results revealed only a small area of activation within the mid-IFG (BA 
45). This more circumscribed degree of brain activation is likely to be due to the 
nature of the nonsense (or unusual but inappropriate) stimuli. It can be 
postulated that the obvious senselessness of the phrases made the recruitment 
of brain areas responsible for semantic retrieval and an increased effort to reach 
a conclusion about the two concepts obsolete. This would have resulted in the 
observed lack of activation in these brain regions when assessing novelty 
processing. This interpretation is backed by findings of a study by Mashal and 
colleagues (2009) who attribute the lack of activation found for their nonsensical 
sentences to their obvious senselessness, which, in turn, rendered the controlled 
semantic retrieval via the anterior IFG (BA 47) unnecessary. The obvious 
senselessness of the phrases used in the present study might also account for 
the lack of activation in other areas, such as MTG (BA 20 and BA 21) and 
temporal pole (BA 38) in relation to novelty processing. As such phrases are 
easily dismissed as senseless, further extensive search and retrieval from 
semantic storage areas in the temporal lobe would be unnecessary. 
 The appropriateness aspect of the phrases in the present study was 
investigated in an explorative manner and showed surprising and, at first glance, 
counterintuitive findings. Appropriateness led to greater activation in the left 
middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), an area that was expected to be activated as a 
function of greater effort to retrieve semantic knowledge during the processing of 
novelty and conceptual expansion. Again, Badre and colleagues' (2005) account 
on semantic memory retrieval is suitable to explain these findings. Semantic 
knowledge stored in temporal areas can be accessed through either automatic or 
IFG-controlled processes. Literal phrases used in the present study are 
commonly encountered in everyday language and are likely accessed through 
automatic processes from temporal areas without the involvement of the IFG, 
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explaining the activation found in the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) and the 
lack of activation in the IFG. 
 In summary, core aspects of the semantic network in the brain, such as 
the IFG and the temporal poles were recruited during passively induced 
conceptual expansion alongside the frontopolar cortex which is involved in 
conceptual relational reasoning and integration.  
 
 
5.2 Implications of the fMRI study 
 
The findings of the present fMRI study on creative cognition carry interesting 
implications and open new directions for the investigation of creativity and 
semantic processing. 
 Most notably, the present fMRI study applied a novel paradigm which 
made it possible to overcome many of the shortcomings and limitations of 
previous studies on creativity. By focusing on one creative process of interest, it 
was possible to relate specific brain areas to conceptual expansion and contrast 
it with brain activity caused by mere novelty and appropriateness. Previous 
studies on creativity often implemented tasks that require a myriad of different 
cognitive processes, resulting in the activation of different brain areas with little 
overlap between studies. By extending this new paradigm to other creative 
cognitive processes, it will be possible to achieve a clearer and more distinctive 
picture of the underlying neural networks involved in creativity. Furthermore, the 
present study showed that a passive approach to assessing conceptual 
expansion provides a viable alternative to investigate neural correlates of 
creativity.  
 It is undisputable that an active conceptual expansion task will recruit 
other cognitive processes in addition to the ones found in the present study. 
However, the broadening or expansion of the conceptual structures that is 
necessary to arrive either at a novel and appropriate solution or to judge the 
novelty and appropriateness of a solution are one and the same. The findings 
 134 
support this notion. Using passive approaches for the fMRI investigation of other 
creative cognitive processes can be advantageous, as it allows researchers to 
avoid many technical problems associated with using neuroimaging-based 
technology and active creative performance tasks, such as long trial durations 
and movements associated with oral or written answers. The passive approach 
allowed for short trial durations and therefore a greater number of trials, leading 
to greater statistical power.  
 As the present study was the first to use a novel approach for the 
investigation of creative cognition, the results are in need of further support 
through replication and more detailed investigation. In particular, the results 
obtained for the processing of novelty are worth exploring further. Future studies 
could, for instance, use unusual and senseless phrases that distinguish between 
obviously senseless stimuli and stimuli that do not appear senseless on first sight 
but rather require further processing in order to judge them as such. Such a 
distinction will make it possible to shed further light on how novelty is processed 
at the neural level. 
 
 
5.3  Discussion of ERP results 
 
Using the novel approach introduced in this work made it possible to link 
established aspects of brain functions to conceptual expansion as a creative 
cognitive process.  
 The N400 ERP component was of especial interest as it has been 
previously implicated as an implicator for semantically incongruous words (Kutas 
& Hillyard, 1980a; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980b), violations of discourse contexts or 
world knowledge (Hagoort et al., 2004; Hald et al., 2007; van Berkum et al., 
2003) and the difficulty of semantic integration (Kutas & Van Petten, 1994) 
among others. It was therefore hypothesized that phrases judged as unusual and 
senseless (nonsense expressions) would show the greatest N400 modification, 
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followed by unusual and appropriate (novel metaphoric expressions) and usual 
and appropriate phrases (literal expressions). 
 The results obtained in the present study were in line with these 
predictions. Although direct comparisons revealed no significant differences in 
the N400 waveform elicited by nonsense phrases (HULA) compared to the novel 
metaphoric phrases (HUHA), the graded effect in the N400 for all three stimuli 
(nonsense > novel metaphoric > literal) was revealed as a significant linear trend 
of the main effect in the statistical analysis. This pattern of results corresponds 
with other findings in the field of language comprehension and metaphor 
processing (e.g., Arzouan et al., 2007; Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Coulson & 
Van Petten, 2007; De Grauwe et al., 2010; Lai et al., 2009; Pynte, Besson, 
Robichon, & Poli, 1996; Tartter, Gomes, Dubrovsky, Molholm, & Stewart, 2002).  
 The conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998) offers one 
way to interpret the graded N400 amplitude for the different types of phrases. 
This theory postulates that language comprehension is based on the construction 
of cognitive models and mapping between its components. Components from 
existing concepts and structures are transferred into a new space and blended. 
In line with this theory, greater N400 amplitudes for senseless or metaphorical 
expressions therefore indicate an increased effort to establish connections 
between distantly related domains and their components. Additionally, 
background knowledge about the distant domains is activated to derive meaning 
(Arzouan et al., 2007).  
 The findings in this field and their interpretations can be extended and 
applied to explain the graded N400 effect found the current study. When taking 
findings from semantic priming studies into consideration that interpret the N400 
component as an indicator for higher-level integrative processes (e.g., Brown & 
Hagoort, 1993; Brown, Hagoort, & Chwilla, 2000; Holcomb, 1993), greater N400 
amplitudes for phrases judged as novel metaphorical and senseless can be seen 
as an increased effort to construe a connection between the two distantly related 
concepts conveyed through the stimuli. Literal phrases do not require this 
increased effort, as they are common phrases containing two concepts that are 
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already strongly associated with one another. The derivation of meaning from 
literal phrases is therefore comparatively effortless. In contrast, senseless and 
novel metaphorical phrases require the integration of two unrelated concepts as 
they are both novel and have likely not been encountered previously. The 
integrational effort seems to be greatest for phrases judged as unusual but 
inappropriate by participants. This is due to their senselessness and the failure to 
successfully integrate and build an association between the two concepts 
conveyed through the phrases. In the case of phrases that participants judged to 
be unusual and appropriate, the increased effort to build a connection between 
the two novel concepts is eventually successful, resulting in a novel conceptual 
combination. Even though direct comparisons between novel metaphorical and 
senseless phrases do not show a significant difference in N400 amplitudes 
between the two types of phrases, the significant linear trend of the main effect 
supports this interpretation. 
 Further support for this interpretation can be taken from findings reported 
by Rhodes and Donaldson (2008) where an N400 modulation was found for word 
pairs with only an associative connection and for word pairs with both a semantic 
and an associative connection as compared to unrelated word pairs. The authors 
found that the N400 was greatest for unrelated word pairs. In the case of novel 
metaphorical phrases in the current study, novel semantic associations were 
established during the experiment by expanding an existing concept to include a 
new feature. The fact that such a novel association could be successfully 
construed for novel metaphorical but not for senseless phrases, similar to 
unrelated word pairs in the Rhodes and Donaldson study, can possibly account 
for the partially lower N400 amplitude for phrases conveying conceptual 
expansion. 
 Other studies have interpreted the N400 as indexing the effort to retrieve 
semantic knowledge from memory stores in the brain (e.g., Kutas & Federmeier, 
2000; Kutas et al., 2006). This interpretation can also be applied to the current 
findings. Both novel metaphorical and senseless phrases are unusual and 
require a greater effort to search for semantic information about the novel 
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concepts conveyed through them. However, as the experimental paradigm was 
not designed to test between competing semantic theories, the findings from this 
study cannot ultimately ascertain whether the greater N400 amplitude for theses 
two types of phrases is due to an increased effort to retrieve semantic knowledge 
or to an increased effort to integrate two distant domains and thereby derive 
meaning. This question certainly requires further research. 
 Another explanation for the greater N400 amplitudes observed for novel 
metaphorical and senseless phrases could be cloze probability. Cloze probability 
refers to the probability with which or expectancy that a certain word completes a 
sentence. As an example, "green" is more likely than "red" to conclude the 
sentence "The grass is ..." and therefore has a higher cloze probability. Some 
studies have found N400 modulations based on the violation of semantic 
expectations (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984). Indeed, both novel metaphorical and 
senseless phrases convey unexpected semantic information in the given context. 
However, the highly significant linear trend suggests that other cognitive 
processes exceeding mere expectation violations are at play. It may be more 
fitting to view these violations of semantic expectations as a catalyst for the 
increased effort to retrieve and integrate semantic information in order to derive 
meaning from these two types of phrases. 
 The investigation of ERP components occurring in the later time-window 
(500 - 900ms after onset of the critical word) was conducted on an exploratory 
basis. Since this study was the first of its kind to investigate ERP components in 
the light of creative cognition, no predictions for the later time-window were 
formulated. The results showed that the later ERP component followed a pattern 
similar to the N400 findings. HULA phrases (nonsense expressions) and HUHA 
phrases (novel metaphorical expressions) elicited a more negative-going 
waveform than LUHA phrases (literal expressions). In contrast to the N400 
findings, however, both direct comparisons and the linear trend revealed that the 
waveforms associated with all three types of phrases differed significantly from 
each other, with HULA phrases (senseless expressions) showing the most 
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negative going waveform, followed by HUHA (novel metaphoric expressions) and 
LUHA phrases (literal expressions). 
 When looking at ERP studies on language processing, heterogeneous 
findings concerning the later time-window become apparent. In some cases, a 
P600 component after N400 can be observed when processing ambiguous 
sentences (Friederici, 1995) and metaphors (Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; De 
Grauwe et al., 2010) in which case this late positive component is often 
interpreted as an indicator for the retrieval and integration of additional 
information to establish a link between formerly unassociated or weakly 
associated concepts. At least one study, however, did not find a P600 
component when processing metaphors as compared to literal sentences (Pynte 
et al., 1996).  
 In the present study, both types of phrases that were judged as unusual or 
novel by participants did not elicit a P600. Instead, an ongoing negativity could 
be observed in the later time-window. This sustained negativity has been 
described in other studies as an indicator for different cognitive processes. 
Ruchkin and colleagues (Ruchkin, Johnson, Mahaffey, & Sutton, 1988) 
interpreted slow negative waves in terms of conceptually difficult to process 
stimuli. Taking into consideration that the concepts contained in phrases that 
were judged as unusual in the present study are, per definition, conceptually 
difficult to process stimuli compared to the literal phrases, this interpretation 
would fit the results at hand. However, the slow negative waves described in 
Ruchkin and colleagues' study differ in onset and latency from the waveform 
found in the present study.  
 Another possible interpretation for the ongoing negativity for unusual or 
novel phrases stems from Rhodes and Donaldson (2008) who found a more 
negative waveform in the later time-window similar to the one found in the 
present study when comparing unrelated word pairs to word pairs that are 
semantically or associatively connected. In their study, this was interpreted as 
recollection from long-term memory for the word pairs with a semantic or 
associative connection, referencing old/new memory effects and episodic 
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retrieval processes as described by Greve, van Rossum and Donaldson (2007) 
and Donaldson and Rugg (1998) among others. This interpretation fits the 
pattern of results found in the present study given that the literal phrases are 
already semantically or associatively linked, whereas phrases judged as unusual 
are presumed to be previously unrelated and therefore require further 
processing. However, the waveform found in Rhodes and Donaldson's study was 
limited to the left parietal areas and the interpretation of their results may 
therefore not be fully applicable to the effect found in the present study, as the 
effect was more widespread, spanning central, centro-parietal and parietal areas. 
 In particular, the effect observed in the later time-window presents itself as 
a continuation of the effects found in the earlier time-window. Phrases 
categorized as novel metaphorical and senseless elicited a more negative-going 
waveform than phrases judged as literal. In contrast to what was found within the 
earlier time-window, however, in the case of the sustained negativity both direct 
comparisons and the linear trend of the condition main effect revealed that the 
waveforms elicited by the three conditions differed significantly from each other.  
 A series of studies were conducted by Jiang, Tan, and Zhou (2009) on 
how violations of universal quantifiers in sentences are processed. As an 
example, the universal quantifier "all" was mismatched with a noun in singular 
object, as in the phrase "He threw away all that apple." The authors reported that 
violations of the universal quantifier did not elicit a N400, but a sustained 
negativity at verb onset instead (Jiang, Tan, & Zhou, 2009). This sustained 
negativity was described as a reinterpretation of the verb after a mismatch 
between the verb and the universal quantifier was detected. The researchers 
interpreted this negative waveform as an indicator for a semantic reinterpretation 
process after the initial attempt to reach meaning has failed.  
 Although these results differ from the findings of the present study with 
regard to the fact that the former did not find a N400 component preceding the 
sustained negativity, a similar underlying process could be assumed to explain 
the sustained negativity found in this study. As a continuation of the N400 
component which is associated with the effort to establish a connection between 
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two semantically distant concepts, the late negativity in the later time-window 
might index the ongoing difficulty to (a) derive meaning from, and (b) establish a 
connection between the two distant concepts. Only in the case of novel 
metaphorical phrases this integrative effort eventually is successful which can 
account for the fact that the waveform becomes more positive in the later time-
window, converging towards the level of the literal phrases. In the case of 
phrases that are judged as nonsensical, this effort to derive meaning and 
integrate the two concepts continues to fail, possibly reflecting the continued 
inability to establish a connection as the two concepts cannot be semantically 
related to one another. Hence, the waveform associated with these senseless 
phrases continues to stay more negative than the waveforms elicited by the two 
other types of phrases. It is important to note, however, that this is an ad hoc 
interpretation that requires further investigation to be confirmed.  
 When considering the similarity of effects observed in both the early and 
the later time-window, it could be argued that the two components may be 
indexing one single continuous effect. However, the findings from the direct 
comparisons between the conditions, as well as the significant linear trend 
implicate that there are two distinguishable effects present, each of them 
indexing a distinct cognitive operation. The linear trends for both ERP 
components suggested a graded effect such that the highest activity was elicited 
by nonsense phrases followed by novel metaphoric expressions, both relative to 
literal phrases. Direct comparisons between the nonsense and novel metaphoric 
expressions, however, indicated that while the N400 elicited by nonsense 
phrases (HULA) was not significantly differentiable from that of the novel 
metaphoric expressions (HUHA), the sustained negativity elicited by novel 
metaphorical phrases (HUHA) diverged significantly from the waveform 
associated with nonsensical phrases (HULA). This suggests the existence of two 
effects. However, the question of whether the observed findings demonstrate one 
singular effect or two distinct effects cannot be fully clarified and requires further, 
more specific investigation.  
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 Nonetheless, the present study on creative cognition lent valuable insights 
on how and which ERP components can be utilized to index passively induced 
conceptual expansion. 
 
 
5.4 Implications of the ERP study 
 
The present ERP study on passive conceptual expansion played an important 
role in the investigation of creative cognition, as it was the first study to associate 
ERP components with creative cognitive processes. The study hence is a 
valuable first step towards a more comprehensive understanding of the neural 
correlates of creativity. The findings implicate that the N400 serves as an 
indicator of conceptual expansion. However, further detailed research is 
necessary to clarify the exact role of the N400 in conceptual expansion. Follow-
up studies are needed to determine whether the N400 in connection with a 
passive conceptual expansion task indicates processes associated with 
information retrieval from semantic memory or higher-level integrative processes 
instead.  
 Regarding the effect found in the later time-window, follow-up studies 
need to be conducted to fully clarify its precise role. Refining the stimulus 
material and conducting a study geared towards investigating the effects in the 
later time-window can provide an important step towards a better understanding 
of the observed effects. 
 The novel paradigm used in the present study proved to be suitable to 
investigate passive conceptual expansion in creative cognition. Using this 
paradigm as a starting point and modifying it to assess other creative cognitive 
processes can pave the way towards painting a clearer, more comprehensive 
picture of the many facets of creative cognition.  
 
 
 142 
5.5 Limitations of the fMRI and ERP studies 
 
Both studies conducted within the framework of this project obtained interesting 
results and led to valuable insights into the neural correlates of creative 
cognition. Nevertheless, the paradigm used in both studies carries specific 
limitations that must be kept in mind when interpreting the associated findings. 
 One of the main goals of this project lay in the emphasis on singling out 
one distinct creative process, namely conceptual expansion, rather than treating 
creativity as a single entity. Even though this approach avoided many downfalls 
of previous studies of creativity, it has to be clearly noted that the results 
obtained by both studies are limited to conceptual expansion. The findings 
cannot be blindly expanded to other creative cognitive processes.  
 Another important limitation to be considered is the fact that the brain 
regions and ERP components implicated to be involved in creative cognition are 
not exclusive to conceptual expansion. Other cognitive operations may recruit the 
same or similar brain areas or may be indexed by the same components used in 
the present study. This is in line with the theoretical framework adopted in the 
present project, namely the creative cognition approach. This approach (see 
section 2.2.2) postulates that fundamental cognitive processes that are present in 
all humans are recruited to form the core of operations that lead to creative 
thinking (Ward et al., 1999).  
 Additionally, the task used in the present studies applied a verbal 
conceptual expansion task relying on semantic relations. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that brain regions and ERP indices corresponding to the semantic 
network of the brain were found to be of significance in the current studies. The 
findings of the study concerning conceptual expansion are hence limited and only 
applicable to creative operations involving verbal semantic relations. Whether or 
not the same brain regions and ERP components would play a role in non-verbal 
and non-semantic creative operations, such as creative imagery, remains an 
open question and cannot be answered through the present work.  
 The most important limitation, however, is that conceptual expansion was 
not explicitly assessed with the present paradigm. Previous neuroimaging and 
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electrophysiological studies required participants to actively generate an original 
and appropriate response. The paradigm used in the present work differed from 
these suboptimal designs in that it used an approach that passively induced 
conceptual expansion. This raises the important question of how well the 
obtained findings can be integrated into existing literature on the neurocognition 
of creativity when the self-generation of ideas is lacking. Even though, this is a 
valid argument, the following arguments that lead to the adoption of a passive 
conceptual expansion task have to be considered. First, one of the problems 
when investigating creativity stems from the fact that creativity is inherently 
unpredictable (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). It is extremely difficult to reliably prompt 
a creative outcome in an experimental setting. In addition, the outcome of 
participants' creative generations is not always guaranteed to be creative. Taken 
together with the many severe methodological problems inherent in the 
neurophysiological investigation of creativity (see section 2.4.2), choosing an 
active task to investigate creativity renders a paradigm to be suboptimal at many 
other levels. In addition, the present work was partly motivated by recent calls in 
the field of creativity to approach the subject in a more innovative and systematic 
manner (Dietrich, 2007). The present work followed this call and focused on 
avoiding many methodological and conceptual difficulties previously associated 
with the investigation of creative thinking by adopting an approach that broke 
down the concept of creativity into its many components and focused on 
assessing the neurocognitive correlates of one operation of importance, 
conceptual expansion.  
 As outlined in a previous section, although it is unconventional to assess 
conceptual expansion through a passive task, it can safely be assumed that 
inducing conceptual expansion passively recruits the same core processes that 
can be observed through brain activations and ERP components, as the 
voluntary and active expansion of concepts. It is undeniable that the active 
expansion of concepts surely requires additional cognitive processes not found in 
a passive task. The conceptual structures that are expanded within the semantic 
network in the brain, however, remain the same in both kind of tasks. The 
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findings presented within this report have been corroborated and extended using 
alternative passive and active conceptual expansion paradigms (Abraham et al., 
2012; Kröger et al., 2012; Kröger et al., 2013).  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The present work served an important purpose as a first stepping stone towards 
a novel approach in the investigation of creative thinking. Following recent calls 
to adopt a more systematic approach in the study of creativity, a novel 
experimental paradigm to assess metaphor processing was developed in the 
present studies that integrated the two defining aspects of creativity, namely 
novelty and appropriateness. By disentangling the very complex concept of 
creativity and considering it as a construct containing many cognitive operations, 
rather than as a single entity, it was possible to investigate the neural correlates 
of one creative cognitive operation, namely conceptual expansion. Utilizing a 
passive approach to induce conceptual expansion made it possible to account for 
individual differences in the organization and reorganization of conceptual 
knowledge and to avoid the many conceptual and methodological problems 
associated with investigating the complex phenomenon of creativity. The fMRI 
study revealed the involvement of brain networks for semantic processing and 
relational reasoning during conceptual expansion compared to the processing of 
mere novelty or appropriateness. The ERP study showed the relevance of the 
N400 and the late sustained negativity in indexing differential processing 
corresponding to semantic novelty and appropriateness. Both studies rendered it 
possible to gain valuable insights into the underlying neural mechanisms of 
creative thinking. Furthermore, the ERP study on creative conceptual expansion 
was the first of its kind and revealed new opportunities for investigation in this 
field. 
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Taken together, the novel approach adopted in the present work, as well as the 
findings of the respective studies, will serve as a vital aid in further investigations 
of creativity and constitutes an important stepping stone towards a better 
understanding of the neurocognitive correlates of this fascinating aspect of 
human thought and behavior. 
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